

Bishkek Papers

Collection of the Papers presented at the OSCE Academy's 1st Alumni Conference on Central Asia: Comprehensive Security and Sustainable Development

To strengthen professional capacity of its alumni to analyse and discuss the regional security dynamics and functional issues in Central Asia, the OSCE Academy organized a conference for its alumni from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Europe and Afghanistan on 3-4 September 2011.

A series of panels identified major emergent themes and trends, and reflected on their strategies impact and security policy implications in the three dimensions- political-military, human and economic-environmental. The focus included presentations on the domestic politics, the role of the OSCE and other international organizations in the region.

OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Botanichesky 1A, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic
720044 Tel.: 996 312 54 32 00
Fax: 996 312 54 23 13 www.osce-academy.net



*Top left: Rustam Karimov '05 (Tajikistan), Alexey Dunditch '05 (Russia) and Dildora Khamidova '05 (Kyrgyzstan)
Top right: Ambassador Andrew Tesoriere, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek and Ms. Anne Marte B. Amble, the Deputy Head of Mission of the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Astana
Bottom left: Dina Iglukova '07 (Kazakhstan) and Ms. Anne Marte B. Amble, the Deputy Head of Mission of the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Astana*

Our sincere gratitude goes to the OSCE, the OSCE-participating states and especially to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), which specifically funds alumni activities of the OSCE Academy!

Contents:

PANEL 1: Political-Military Dimension.....	5
Prospects for the Development of a Security Community in Central Asia”	5
Russia's Perspective for regional political stability in former Soviet Central Asia.....	9
OSCE relations with Afghanistan: challenges of engagement.....	12
PANEL 2: Human Dimension.....	15
Humanitarian response to June 2010 events in southern Kyrgyzstan: humanitarian actors and security organizations.....	15
Human rights developments in Turkmenistan vs EU energy demands.....	18
Results of the Kazakh Chairmanship in the OSCE: Human Dimension.....	20
PANEL 3: Economic-Environmental Dimension.....	23
Development of water-power engineering is a base of steady development of the Central Asia.....	23
The Impact of Environment Security Initiative in Central Asia: Project on Radioactive Waste Management.....	26

PANEL 1: Political-Military Dimension

Prospects for the Development of a Security Community in Central Asia

Dina Iglukova' 07, MA Student in International Security, University of Warwick, UK

Opponent: Ernest Turdubaev '06, National Project Officer, UNODC, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

The idea that Central Asian countries have a conflict-ridden history and geopolitics is so persistent that it has become the defining feature of Central Asian studies. It has been substantially covered by scholars and journalists in the past – and even now this approach remains attractive as new developments are taking place in this unique region.

Indeed the ancient history of Central Asia is full of conflicts and wars, however from the inception of the Soviet project to the present times, one may argue that Central Asia, despite the fact that “security situation (...) has been deteriorating in various respects since the end of the decade,”¹ has remained a low tension area.

Certainly, realists might argue that the existing vast conflict potential, first, was never activated due to the geostrategic *raison d'être* that prevented countries from going to war. And second, unlike the mainstream perception that authoritarian regimes are aggressive, most of the authoritarian regimes in fact are peaceful because authoritarian leaders usually rely on elites, bearers of power and capital, who would most likely oppose the idea of financing shady military enterprises that can undermine their position.

There is, of course, some legitimacy in these arguments, however this paper invites to apply the alternative theory of security community as a foil to analyze additional factors that contributed to the peaceful transition in Central Asia and to examine whether these factors are able further to maintain the peace. The paper will evaluate the state of the security community and prospects for its development across the following trajectories: *collective identity, many-sided relations, longterm co-operation*.

Before continuing, however, it is instructive to equip reader with a brief overview of the SC concept. The SC theory defends the idea of the community – the group of states that on their evolutionary road to the Kantian perpetual peace reached the level of understanding that the violent settling of conflict is the least wanted tool. The concept that emerged right after the horrors of the Second World War seriously contested the realist paradigm, however, remained largely ignored because of dominating power approach.

Collective identity

Alexander Wendt in investigating the roots of collective identity comes to the idea that structural context consists of a common social knowledge and commonly accepted basic values.² The more positive the structural context is, i.e. the better the understanding about threats among the members, the easier and faster the collective identity emerges.

In Central Asia the unique Soviet model of the divide and rule principle ensured that all Soviet Republics enjoyed partial autonomy and were the source for national self identification, while at the same time they were bonded by the common socio-political structure of the Soviet state that envisaged deep incorporation into the Soviet ideology.

Despite the rapid ideological change in the nineties, the old identification of *homo Sovieticus*, has remained intact in all spheres. The Central Asian establishment – tied by Russian language, being the alumni of Soviet educational civil and military institutions, having common memories, and using the old structures - was the bearer of the collective Soviet identity. This common social knowledge and collective

¹ Roy Allison (ed.), *Central Asian Security*, London: Chatham House 2001; p.254

² Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review*, 1994, 88/2; pp.388-391

identity, despite interpersonal enmity and rivalries between leaderships of five republics, helped avoid open violent conflicts and both officially and unofficially come to compromise.

In the well known dispute between Farkhod Tolipov and Murat Laumulin about regional rivalry of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and competition for leadership, Tolipov accuses Kazakhstan for promoting its pseudo-Eurasian identity at the price of Central Asian, claiming that Uzbekistan, to the contrary, is keen to identify itself as a Central Asian state.³

This entertaining polemic between two scholars from Central Asia in fact denudes the sad truth on what is Central Asia, and who should be considered Central Asian. While the five post-Soviet states in the region have significantly advanced in their state building efforts, there has been little done in building a regional identity. The current rising nationalism in Central Asia is circumscribing the plexus of identity in the region and deteriorating the old collective identity without building a new one.

The young establishment that would come into power would not share the sentiments of the Soviet period. This generation is raised in the atmosphere of different countries: national interests, invented past, visa regimes, mined borders, different alphabets, different economies, and state ideologies. Unlike western scholarship, the local academia is highly interested in the security-collective identity binary. In analyzing the failure of modern integration projects in Central Asia, they justly see a weak regional identity as a major obstacle towards efficient integration and regional security.

Despite the objective factors such as common territory, history, culture, ethnic roots, language, religion, the regional identity in Central Asia is far from becoming mature and still is in the process of development. As Martha Brill Olcott justly notices "shared experience has never formed the basis of a shared national identity."⁴ The Central Asian states rather tend to speed up the processes of differentiation through intensifying and accentuating artificial dissimilarity which, together with creating additional barriers, do not lend support to the construction of common collective identity.

Opponent's remark: The idea of collective identity is hard to apply to the population of Central Asia. Literally, in order to be identified as part of a team or certain group, first you have to know your own identity and your role or place in this group. Nobody wants to identify himself or herself as a member of something weak, poor, unknown or failed. Once the countries become known on the world political scene, and not identified as failed or nearly failed, or at least less criticized by the world community, people will start identifying themselves with their own country of citizenship on the first stage. On the second stage, a regional collective identity can emerge as people learn about the shared history and legacies of Central Asian nations.

Many-sided institutional contacts

The fathers of SC theory believed that the sense of community first has to emerge in the people's minds and only afterwards could be replicated on the international level. Indeed this "we" feeling could germinate only after close contacts between nations. John Ruggie, building on Durkheim's ideas, introduced the notion of dynamic density of interaction, meaning the volume, speed and variety of contacts existing within the community of states. For him, the rise of dynamic density could significantly influence the systemic level.⁵

Coming back to Central Asia, the many-sided contacts in the security sphere could be divided into regular meetings within the existing security structures sponsored by the external players such as Russia and China, and the grassroots gatherings organized and funded by either states or numerous international donors. There are two persistent trends. First, The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), orchestrated by Russia, and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), dominated by both Russia and China, provide fruitful legal framework for the security dialogue. However, if SCO remains in the safe domain of its vague definition of neither military nor security forum, the CSTO, to the contrary, is a purely collective security alliance which on the one hand has a strong legal personality, but on the

³ Tolipov to Laumulin, <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1267266480>

⁴ Martha Brill Olcott, "Common Legacies and Conflicts", in Roy Allison (ed.), *Central Asian Security*, London: Chatham House 2001; p.29

⁵ John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity*, London: Routledge 1998; p.151

other hand is eroded by the unwillingness of certain member-states to fully co-operate, thus, undermining the quality of many-sided contacts.

Another regional structure sponsored by the Central Asian states was the 1994-1998 ambitious project of Central Asian Union that included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and was actively supported by the US and Europe, as they considered homogeneous and integrated Central Asia to be the last bastion or the buffer zone against the radical Islamic world and rising China. When in 1998 it became evident that Union did not function, it was reorganized into the modest structure called Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) with the participation of Tajikistan and Russia as an observer. In 2002, when the American presence in Central Asia significantly increased, a new ambitious structure was created to replace CAEC – the Organization of Central Asian Co-operation (OCAC). Its goal was to activate regional integration without participation of Russia and was actively supported by the US. However, already in 2004 the political landscape changed again, Russia was accepted to OCAC, and in 2005 it was decided to unite OCAC with the Eurasian Economic Community.

Overall institutional self-sufficiency of Central Asia is poor because of obvious reasons. First, Turkmenistan never participated in any regional initiative due to its status of positive neutrality. Second, Tajikistan because of civil war rejoined the region only in 1998. Third, Uzbekistan's sharp political manoeuvres largely disturbed the possible efficiency of the regional contacts. Last but not least the created regional structures were rather phantom because they heavily depended on external support (primarily from the competing US, Russia and China).

Speaking briefly about grassroots regional meetings both with the participation of state officials and without them, one may observe the following dynamic. The majority of the so-called Central Asia forums take place either in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan. The participation of Uzbekistan's or Turkmenistan's representatives is rare because of these states' regional positions and because of existing draconian measures that do not allow common citizens to freely travel within the region. On another note, the majority of regional events are funded by diverse number of international institutions such as UN, OSCE, the World Bank, and so on, or foreign (either American or European) organizations. Thus, one may see that there is a continuation and extension of Western policy towards integrated Central Asia.

Opponent's remark: In many cases institutions or governments of Central Asia do not really represent the interests of their own populations but mostly proceed with decisions sent down from their leaders. As political elites tend to change as a tribute to the latest trend or fashion of revolutions, the outcomes of many-sided institutional contacts can change significantly.

Long-term co-operation

This part addresses the question of whether any long term sense of obligation and responsibility exists among Central Asian states. It will do so through considering the important long term bilateral co-operation in the areas of water distribution, delimitation of border, ethnic minorities and territorial claims. Unfortunately, these issues have never become the starting point for dialogue and co-operation, but rather served as political levers for politicians in the region.

By and large, the Central Asian states are loath to co-operate with each other on the vital issues such as water, energy, and ethnic conflicts. The myriads of intergovernmental meetings took place in the last decade. It is certainly beyond the scope of this paper to scrutinize the legal basis and the quality of these meetings. However, one thing is clear – Central Asian states have been unable to find a healthy balance between their national interests and long-term regional sustainability. Every state is rather concerned with the parochial ad hoc decision and is prone to distrust others. The existing rich legal framework remains inefficient due to the absence of practical agreements and reluctance to enforce the legislation.

Opponent's remark: We deal with long-lasting governments in Central Asia, when one leader or one political elite group is almost unchangeable. In these circumstances it is almost meaningless to say that we do not have long-term co-operation. To say it otherwise, we do have 'long-term', but we do not have 'co-operation'. I am afraid, politically stable regimes of Central Asia cannot come to long-term agreements in the interests of their own populations. When

can that change? When the state leadership changes. The idea is that shorter-lasting governments just could bring long-lasting cooperation in the interests of citizens. I am trying to appeal to the Theory of Democratic Peace, when one democratic country does not fight another. In today's rapid globalization, fast changing world order and geopolitics, it is very complicated to build LONG-term cooperation.

Exit strategy

The speed of social learning highly depends on the power centres in the prototypical security community. If there is a state bearer of high standards of economical and cultural development and good administrative and social organization, the process of learning can go fast. However learning is something more than simple copying. It occurs when there is a charismatic leader in the community, whose example inspires other states to follow the same path.

Coming back to the dispute between Tolipov and Laumulin about regional leadership, both to some extent admitted that there are no leaders at all. Since it is obvious that the prospects for development of a security community in Central Asia are bleak, there is an urgent need for a leader who can consolidate the region. This leadership will be characterized not by the hard power only, but by the efficiency of the state management that would be attractive for others to adopt. The old personal rivalries will lose the purchasing power as the world gets more and more globalized. When one of the Central Asian states is ready to export its recipe for effective state management, Central Asia can start turning into a security community.

Last but not least, in the light of American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Central Asian security architecture is under high risk. Old collective identities, fragile compromises, and weak agreements might fall under the onslaught of Afghan instability. However, a good news comes again from constructivists. According to Wendt, the choice of allies and enemies plays a key role in international relations. To be precise, the formation of a regional security structure is highly influenced by the perception of who the external "friends", "foes", and "competitors" are. If the Euro-Atlantic integration in the face of the Soviet "enemy" any indication, the perspectives of Central Asian integration in the presence of an unstable Afghanistan might have positive outcomes, too.

Opponent's remark: Political leaders do not copy other political leaders, and this is especially true of the Central Asian leaders. Presidents in Central Asia tend to be unique and inimitable. The idea of creation of a political messiah for Central Asia is the wrong direction.

As for the Afghan instability, we can face problems if Americans withdraw all its troops. But we forgot that even before the deployment of US troops in Afghanistan, Central Asia existed. We existed for worse or for better, and it will not be a new experience for us. Even a joint Central Asian military action took place during the Batken War in the south of Kyrgyzstan.

Russia's perspective for regional political stability in former Soviet Central Asia

Alexey Dunditch '05, Coordinator of Masters Programmes, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the MFA of Russia (MGIMO), Moscow, Russia

Opponent: Ernest Turdubaev '06, National Project Officer, UNODC, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

The collapse of the Soviet Union in Central Asia exposed a number of destabilizing factors emerging in the late Soviet time, such as religious extremism, inter-ethnic conflicts, drug trafficking, poverty, and destruction of basic socio - economic and socio - political ties between the former Soviet republics. The most severe forms of post-Soviet anarchy could be observed in Tajikistan, where large-scale and with varying degrees of intensity civil conflict went on until the end of the 1990s. The conflict was complicated by the retraction of the external forces and by the danger of its transformation from local to regional and inter-regional conflict.

If the regional stability has previously been ensured by the Soviet Union center (Moscow), the collapse of the USSR generated a need for a new model of stability. Russia has been the guarantor of stable development in Central Asia for a long historical period and with the emergence of internal problems it has temporarily weakened support for the Central Asian republics. In view of this there were a lot of doubts in the survival of the newly independent states. It became clear that the space that emerged after the collapse of the USSR would be filled by foreign centers of power seeking to stabilize Central Asia on the basis of their national interests. Development alternatives for the newly independent states were: an Islamic orientation subdivided into the Iranian, Pakistani and Saudi models of development, a pan-Turkic model postulated by Turkey, democratization by taking into account the Western model, and partnership with the rapidly growing Chinese economy. However, experience has shown that none of those countries, including the USA and China, has the stable interest and political will to support small and medium - sized countries of the region that Russia does.

Russia is interested in Central Asian stability more than other countries because of the longest in the world and difficult-to-manage border with Kazakhstan, and vulnerability in the face of conventional and unconventional threats of Central Asian and Middle Eastern origin. Moreover, Central Asia has important factors that inevitably chain Russian attention. First of all, there is the presence of a numerous Russian - speaking population in the countries of the region, and economic interests. All of this resulted in the inevitable return of Russia to the region following its internal stabilization. In accordance with its national interests, Russia provides political, financial and military support to Central Asia.

Opponent's remark: The demographic situation, with a reduction of the native population of Russia, dictates its terms and Russia uses its opportunity and increases its population with immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In the best cases those migrants are Russian-speaking, well-educated ethnic Russians, and in the worst case, they are just Russian-speakers and human resources, to be politically correct. The main concern why people leave Central Asia is a politically unstable and economically insecure situation in the region. Hence, the Opponent suggests that Russia has benefits from instability in Central Asia. As for the economic interest - it exists, but the size is small, not to say tiny. Russia's share in the Foreign Trade Turnover of Central Asia was about 16-26 %. That shows that Russia is a crucial part of the economy in Central Asia. But, Central Asia's share in the Foreign Trade Turnover of Russia was about 1.9-4.5 %. This is not decisive and big enough to say that Russia has a real economic interest in Central Asia.

An important part of the formation of the Central Asian model of stability has been the creation of regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Cooperation. These have created a basis for negotiations, exchange of opinions and forging of a common position on a number of complex regional issues. Russia has become one of the driving forces in all of these organizations. Engaging China into the process of economic stabilization in the region and its active cooperation with the CIS countries in the

SCO framework has allowed speaking about the appearance of a stable political and economic space of Central – Eastern Asia⁶.

We can say that the newly independent states survived and kept all the attributes of sovereign statehood by 2000. According to all of the above, it is possible also to conclude that for the Central Asian states the post-Soviet transitional period was over by the end of 2001: the dissolution of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had a destructive effect on the stability in the republics of Central Asia, and the formation of the EurAsEC, leading to the stabilization of the regional economic sphere.

20 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not enough time to determine the existing laws of regional development, but enough to observe the formation of a separate Central Asian subsystem of international relations, which has been standing apart from the rest of the post-Soviet space since 2000-2001. From 2000 to 2010 we can characterize regional political situation as “pulsating instability”. Instability is inherent in the Central Asian subsystem of international relations. The biggest points of local instability can be considered the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the Andijan events in Uzbekistan in 2005 and the Kyrgyz revolution in 2010. However, the internal instability in the countries of the region did not become a reason for a region-wide destabilization and did not lead to the internationalization of the conflicts.

The threat of a protracted internal conflict with the involvement of external forces, where sometimes it is difficult to clearly define the warring parties, is more real in Central Asia than the threat of a classical interstate war. Contemporary regional security system cannot protect the system against the pulsating instability at the national level. It does not even try to do so, preferring carefully to observe the situation. Interference of some state into a conflict has a danger of that state's being drawn into the conflict (example of interference to conflict in Afghanistan). Another reason for such system's reaction is *the fear of the members for interference in their affairs*. Intervention into the internal affairs of a neighbor country could set a precedent in their own case.

Potential for instability's outbreak at the regional level still exists, despite the coordinated actions of regional countries. We can see it on the example with Kyrgyzstan. Overpopulated Ferghana Valley has attracted particular attention. One of the indicators of high risk of instability here is the conflict in Osh between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010.

Regional stability is different from regional security. We can understand security as a condition of the system, when the external and internal factors cannot damage or destroy the system. Stability is the system's ability to cope with the destructive impacts that come from inside. Nowadays security cannot be reduced to ensure the removal of threats on time. At the same time stability cannot be characterized at this stage by the fact that the system copes with the existing threats. In the current international context it is difficult to say with certainty what kind of risks the system can struggle with, and which of them will develop into threats and destroy it.

In Central Asia it is due to the synthesis of formal (regional institutions and bilateral agreements) and informal (personal contacts between the Heads of States) leverages that the regional community is capable to maintain regional stability. The system copes with emerging regional threats, but cannot cope with threats at the national level, the main indicator of which is the destruction of the political system in Kyrgyzstan that occurred twice. Thus, the security level of the regional system is not high. The system of regional stability cannot take into account the full range of factors that can threaten it and to ensure that the situation does not go out of control (e.g., the escalation of conflicts in the Ferghana Valley).

The main task for the regional countries and international organizations is to find appropriate steps to fight the causes of instability. Therefore, a strategic goal for Russia and other countries is not just the achievement of a stable development, but also achieving a “*stable security*” situation, the condition for which will be such a state of system, when in the process of socio - political development there are not only no threats, but also no new threats appear, which are potentially capable to damage the system, changing its basic traits. In such a state the system is not «threat-o-genic», that is, it is not conducive to the emergence of new threats.

⁶ Alexey Bogaturov, “Central Eastern Asia in Contemporary International Politics”, *Orient*, No. 1, 2005; pp. 102-118.

Achieving this aim is impossible without conducting the common Russia-Central Asian policy of partnership to achieve stable security. To ensure such a policy, Russia could offer its support and the Central Asian countries could raise their level of openness and readiness for changes in domestic policy.

Opponent's remark: We should understand that if the whole Central Asia is very well integrated among each other, and stability of the region is the common idea of all five States, we would not need any support or political patronage from the superpowers. We do not need any mediator, regulator or military airbases of different countries. Each and every subject of international relations knows that, and interested ones do their best to collide Central Asian countries with each other, using various tools to reach that target. Those tools were very well listed by Alexey. "These threats and challenges are inter-ethnic tensions inside states, religious extremism networks, border challenges, shared trans-border rivers, mine fields, energy resources consumption etc." When the collapse of the USSR was coming to an end, the Central Asian leaders were discussing their serious concerns and the ways of building a strong Country in the region, or even a Confederation, or at least an economic union. Should I remind you that right after such initiatives the inter-ethnic conflict among the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations of Osh city in Fergana Valley took place?

After that event the population of the region, who were brothers and neighbors in real life and not just on paper or in some politician's speech, stopped trusting each other, and the idea of common borders, whether economic or military, was deleted from the agenda of the young countries. Such a fabricated conflict and other disputable threats can be escalated in any time by any interested party, and it happened last year in Kyrgyzstan. After the last year's revolution in Kyrgyzstan, almost all of Kyrgyzstan's high officials visited Moscow to show their respect and readiness for any kind of cooperation. These suggest that Kyrgyzstan needs more attention and support from Russia's side.

So here is the answer to the question of how Russia can build stability in Central Asia: Russia has to become the key player and the dominant superpower in Central Asia. Otherwise, when different countries of the region pursue different foreign policies and foreign strategies, it is guaranteed that there will be no stability in the region.

OSCE relations with Afghanistan: challenges of engagement

Jafar Usmanov '05, National Officer, OSCE Office in Dushanbe, Tajikistan

Opponent: Elham Gharji '10, President, Gawharshad Institute of Higher Education and Research Manager, the World Bank, at the Ministry of Rural Development of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan

Back in 2007, at its 15th Ministerial Meeting in Madrid, the 56 OSCE participating States decided to intensify co-operation with Afghanistan with the aim of contributing to stability and security in this country. The decision was taken in response to the formal request of the Government of Afghanistan to provide assistance in three specific areas - border security and management, policing, and fight against drug trafficking.

The Ministerial Decision provided a good framework for intensifying and consolidating the OSCE engagement with Afghanistan. The OSCE executive structures were tasked to accelerate work with Afghanistan through increased involvement with the Afghan side. The OSCE Secretary General was, *inter alia*, tasked "with examining the prospects for intensifying OSCE action to support measures for securing the borders between the Central Asian participating States and Afghanistan in line with the objectives and principles set forth in the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept" and "with exploring all possible co-operation options, in co-ordination with the United Nations and other relevant regional and international organizations and other actors, and making proposals".⁷ The foreign ministers also encouraged "the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, in consultation with their host governments, to intensify the involvement of Afghan counterparts in their relevant activities".⁸ Besides, it was instructed that the OSCE work with Afghanistan should be cross-cutting and cross-dimensional, which corresponds to the comprehensive security approach of the organization. It was also underlined that the OSCE should not duplicate any activities of other international actors, but coordinate its initiatives with other stakeholders.

The tasks set in front of the OSCE were complex and required considerable resources from the organization. At the same time, the decision to engage with Afghanistan opened up various directions of working with Afghan partners without entering the country. In particular, it encouraged the neighbouring Central Asian and other participating States to more actively engage Afghan counterparts in security and law enforcement-related activities. It also called on OSCE field operations in Central Asia (primarily, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) to act more proactively in terms of integrating Afghan components into their activities.

Now, four years after the decision to engage with Afghanistan, it is a good time to look at the progress the OSCE has achieved so far in implementing the Ministerial Decision No. 4/07 and, therefore, progress made toward security and stability in Afghanistan. Already in 2008, under the Finnish chairmanship, the OSCE Secretariat launched several lines of consultations with international community, including consultations with participating States and contacts with international organizations; a few fact-finding missions were dispatched to the Central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan to identify potential areas of OSCE assistance. These efforts resulted in a package of 16 'Afghan' projects, which were drafted by the OSCE Secretariat and circulated among the participating States. The projects targeted the areas of strengthening border security, fostering cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan and Central Asia, and building the capacity of Afghan law enforcement. Afghan representatives were becoming more frequent participants in workshops, seminars, trainings, and conferences organized or hosted by the OSCE Chairmanship, Secretariat, and its field operations.

What has changed in security situation in Afghanistan since 2007? Security in Afghanistan remains in many ways key to security in the whole OSCE area, and particularly in Central Asia. Attacks on governmental officials and terrorist acts against civilian population and ISAF forces continue to

⁷ OSCE Ministerial Decision No. 4/07.

⁸ *Ibid.*

occupy the news headlines from Afghanistan. Taliban activity has been on the rise over the last two years, while the UNODC assessments did not show decrease in drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

Has OSCE made any progress in contributing to security in Afghanistan through engaging with it? I argue that after more than three years of working with Afghanistan, challenges of engagement have not decreased or diminished. There are four main challenges that tie up OSCE hands in addressing the priority areas set in 2007. I would divide these challenges in two groups: internal to the OSCE, and internal to Afghanistan. Firstly, political support and sustainability of OSCE engagement with Afghanistan is questionable, as the much needed consensus on the Programme of activities on implementing the Ministerial Decision 4/07 did not find support from the member states. The last three years showed that diverging interests of the participating States was a major internal, or even an inherent, challenge that the OSCE could hardly solve.

Opponent's remark: From the Opponent's point of view, these are indeed challenging issues. However, all these problems seem to be inherent in the OSCE's concept of security in the region of Central Asia, which excludes Afghanistan from the OSCE's direct engagement in the region. Such a concept promotes a vision of security that advocates protective measures against Afghanistan. This eventually undermines the efficiency and sustainability of any engagement with Afghanistan by the OSCE. The effort of the OSCE with Afghanistan has been following only protective measures and perspectives, encouraging the OSCE to focus on securing the Central Asian borders from Afghanistan. The geo-political limit in the OSCE efforts to secure bordering Central Asian states from Afghanistan has indicated to the Afghans that the OSCE's cooperation with Afghanistan is built around the logic of protecting Central Asia from Afghanistan. This logic has avoided the need to work to improve things in Afghanistan directly. In other words, such perspective on Afghanistan views Afghanistan as a threat and not as a threatened part of the Central Asian security complex. For this reason, the engagement has been limited both in scope and kind, focusing on protective measures only. Such an engagement is not expected to have visible and sustainable impact on the regional security.

Second, and stemming from the first, the much needed financial resources pledged or otherwise committed by the participating States were insignificant to date. Besides, very few projects from the package of 16 Afghan options left the desks of the member-state delegations and their respective capitals, thus bringing scepticism to capacity building for Afghan partners.

Opponent's remark: The OSCE might not be able to fund huge governance and security programs in Afghanistan, but through adopting an active participation along with other international organizations, it can have a more visible role in the building of the country. As the largest regional security organization in the world, the OSCE's engagement with Afghanistan has been very limited and invisible. The scope of cooperation, e.g. training of the border and anti-drug police in Afghanistan, have to be appreciated, but they constitute small effort- small in terms of number and size of the project that would not make a national impact.

Third, it remains challenging to motivate Afghan partners to commit themselves to certain strategies, agreed principles and solutions. It is even more challenging to ensure follow-up action from Afghan partners on issues agreed upon or consented. One such example could be a border delegate framework for cross-border cooperation between the border agencies of Afghanistan and neighbouring Central Asian states. Fourth, there are virtually no possibilities to monitor and verify if Afghan partners actually use the skills and knowledge received during OSCE-funded and/or organized events. There has been no assessment of progress achieved in the last years by the OSCE. Likewise, there has been no such effort or activity conducted by Afghan counterparts, which ultimately leaves us with reliance on intuitive assessment or subjective accounts from the recipient country.

Opponent's remark: To this remark by the author, the opponent replies that the Afghan government is corrupt and irresponsible. This undermines the success of many international efforts in Afghanistan. However, given the scope of the OSCE engagement with Afghanistan, the training projects are not expected to have had significant impact in Afghanistan. The scope of the OSCE engagement with Afghanistan has not been substantial if compared with the other international involvements in that country.

Apparently, the virtues of engagement with Afghanistan and expectations thereof are balanced out by challenges of integrating Afghan partners in a Central Asian dimension of the OSCE activities to promote security and stability in the region. As the focus on indirect engagement with Afghanistan will likely expand in the next few years, the OSCE will have to devise a more sustainable and systematic framework agreed by all participating States for reaching the goals set in Madrid back in 2007.

PANEL 2: Human Dimension

Humanitarian response to June 2010 events in southern Kyrgyzstan: humanitarian actors and security organizations

Diana Mamatova '09, Reporting Officer, Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), Osh, Kyrgyzstan

Opponent: DiIldora Khamidova '05 Project Coordinator, NGO, Public Foundation "Centre for Multicultural and Multilingual Education," Osh, Kyrgyzstan

On 10 June 2010, a violent conflict broke out in southern Kyrgyzstan. In less than 10 days over 1,900 houses were damaged, and numerous others were looted. The number of casualties is high but not yet confirmed. Conflict led to the displacement of approximately 400,000 people, of which nearly 100,000 crossed the border to seek refuge in neighbouring Uzbekistan. An estimated 560,000 refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and local populations in Osh and Jalal-Abad were directly affected by the conflict.

High expectations were set over humanitarian response from regional security organizations and humanitarian actors to the violent crisis that erupted in Osh, Jalal-Abad and its surroundings in June 2010. While humanitarian community was by and large able to respond to the needs of affected populations, regional security organizations could have contributed more towards efforts to stop the violence and stabilize the country. What was their response, and was it their priority?

Response of regional security organizations

None of the three main regional security organizations, i.e. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), were able to respond to the June 2010 events in southern Kyrgyzstan.

CSTO, Moscow-led security organization, had a limited role in the Kyrgyzstani conflict and did not show efforts to be actively involved in resolving the crisis. With the establishment of CSTO peacekeeping forces Russia was positioning itself as a dominant actor in the region. A year before the violent events in Kyrgyzstan, Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) was formed with the idea to respond to "three evils" as well as regional conflicts. The events seem not to have required a new mission or mandate for the organization, but Moscow and other state members decided unilaterally not to intervene.

Opponent's remark: On the CSTO response, in general it existed only on paper and can't be useful to overcome any "real" conflict within its member states' territory. The pre-conditions and decision making mechanisms for using of Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) are still unclear. The neighboring countries were and will be absolutely against the deployment of CORF to resolve any conflicts and restore the peace in Fergana valley. CSTO did not interfere in the conflict and it is unclear what would happen if it did. Perhaps, with massive troops and arms deployed on the ground, we might have avoided high number of casualties. But it is yet doubtful that actions from the CSTO would be swift and rapid given the notorious slow decision-making of the member countries. Ideally, in this case, a rapid deployment of troops is required in the first three days at the outbreak of the crisis.

SCO, predominantly led and influenced by Beijing but with substantial presence of Moscow, did not play a role in stabilizing the country. Many statements and visits were made around the tragic events and a visit of fifty children to Hainan province in China was organized to recuperate from the riots. However, even though the violence in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted not far away from Xinjiang region, and with possible spill over effect of the conflict to neighbouring communities, Beijing seemed to be largely irresponsible.

Opponent's remark: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established to create the image of so-called "effective coordination and cooperation" of Russia and its backyard with the yellow dragon – China. The SCO doesn't have clear mechanisms of responding to any regional conflicts; therefore nothing was expected from the SCO during and right after the June violence.

What are the main reasons that restricted regional leaders – Russia and China – to duly respond to the June violence within the frameworks of CSTO and SCO? Was it because of ongoing instability in their own territories – Tibet, Xinjiang in China, Caucasus in Russia that it was in their interest to maintain a non-interference position? Or, perhaps Russia wanted to signal that without it (customs union) the CA countries would drown in blood because of internal conflicts?

Finally, reaction of OSCE was rather slow and ineffective in the challenging situation in the country. After request from the Interim Government of Kyrgyzstan, the Permanent Council adopted a decision to deploy OSCE Police Advisory Group with 54 international staff for a period of one year to advice and support to police forces in three southern regions in Kyrgyzstan – a proposal that never materialized in the face of a significant public mobilization against it that saw the idea as an unwanted foreign interference. In addition, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek was strengthened and OSCE PA' Special Representative for Central Asia, Kimmo Kiljunen, led the International Independent Commission for Inquiry into the June events.

Opponent's remark: OSCE, yes, it was the most active regional security organization that tried to respond to the violence. But, at the same time, the June violence and its aftermath exposed many drawbacks of the organization and ineffectiveness of its projects in the area of conflict prevention and police reform in Kyrgyzstan. It would be essential to analyze OSCE's long-run conflict prevention and police reform projects: were there any positive changes/results, and if not, why? What about the current OSCE activities: are the conflict prevention, reconciliation and mediation activities being conducted among the right people who carry conflict potential – businessmen, sportsmen, informal community leaders? Or do they still target non-contentious parts of population – the elderly, women, formal religious leaders, NGO activists? What about the PAG (Police Advisory Group) that was never deployed and negatively affected the OSCE image? The CSI – impaired version of PAG was not effective and did not play any role in stabilization of the situation and could not respond to continuous ethnic based human rights violations in Osh and Jalalabad.

Response of humanitarian actors

The Humanitarian Country Team⁹ was actively involved in responding to humanitarian needs during emergency phase. Various tools were used during humanitarian response to ensure effective coordination between organizations: 3W (Who does What Where) database was developed, various clusters were identified as sectors of intervention (health, protection, shelter and non-food items, water sanitation and hygiene, food security, agriculture, education and emergency and community restoration), and various researches, studies, surveys and assessments were carried out jointly by humanitarian actors to identify needs and prioritize urgent and essential programmes, to collect more information and fill the gaps and to improve planning and intervention overall.

After a year from the June 2010 events UN Humanitarian Coordinator concluded results of humanitarian intervention in the country. To summarize: donors, private businesses and governments from over 40 countries supported the humanitarian response; \$66 million was received (which covered 70 per cent of the Kyrgyzstan Extended and Revised Flash Appeal). Although not all the needs and concerns of affected populations were met, humanitarian response was supportive and assistance provided was quite substantial.

⁹ The Humanitarian Country Team, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, is the centre-piece of the humanitarian coordination architecture. Initially four organizations (ACT alliance/Helvetas, Mercy Corps, HelpAge and Save the Children and ICRC as an observer) represented interests of NGOs; later all organizations undertaking humanitarian action in Kyrgyzstan participated in coordination meetings, organized by OCHA

Conclusion

The extent of the crisis development was deepened by ineffective response of regional security organizations in stopping the violence. CSTO, SCO and OSCE were unable to respond effectively to June events in southern Kyrgyzstan. The response by humanitarian actors to erupted conflict has been more successful. A big team of humanitarian organizations came together to effectively respond to the needs of affected communities. Joint actions directed towards addressing those needs were well coordinated and implemented. Today, the transition from response to recovery and development activities has been completed. Conflict prevention and peace building remain to be the priority for humanitarian organizations, but what is the priority for security organizations? While they weigh their options of responding, Kyrgyzstan might search for a more protective "security umbrella". Perhaps, the Central Asian region as a whole might reassess security arrangements within this geographical area and question the effectiveness of existing security organizations.

Opponent's remarks: Humanitarian response of the main actor – the Kyrgyz Government has completely missed in the paper. The central government of Kyrgyzstan although lately, sometime insufficiently but responded to the crisis, by providing compensations to the victims who lost their family members, property and businesses. Tensions between the central government and Osh city authorities regarding the humanitarian issues and the recovery of damaged houses should be also analyzed, since Osh city authorities, in some occasions undermined the whole humanitarian campaign undertaken by the both, central government and international organizations (master plan, corruption in Osh city architectural department, alleged fraud with humanitarian aid donations (mainly food items)).

In the context of the recent developments in the south of Kyrgyzstan international entities were limited in their immediate involvement. Their action would have been viewed as interference in internal affairs of Kyrgyzstan, thus this factor prevented any sort of immediate action.

International humanitarian organizations responded well to the crisis by offering food packages, clothes, materials and expertise in restoring of damaged houses. However, their work in the south of Kyrgyzstan was not coordinated well. The locals from Osh even feel competition between different IOs that were not transparent and not willing to share information between them.

Human rights developments in Turkmenistan vs EU energy demands

Svetlana Dzardanova '09, Research and Training Assistant, OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

This paper discusses the reasons for intensifying EU relations with the hydrocarbon-rich Turkmenistan despite poor human rights records and unwillingness of Turkmen leadership to improve this situation.

The most recent British Petroleum (BP) statistical review forecasts a continued energy market share decline for oil and growth for gas. Europe finds itself in a worrying situation as its gas consumption will move up, while production will fall due to already depleting fields.¹⁰ This means that EU will need to find ways to control and reduce, if possible, energy demand. It has already pledged "to cut its energy consumption by 20% (compared with projected levels) by 2020."¹¹

The EU's energy mix gradually moves towards increasing usage of natural gas and renewable energy sources. This shift, however, will not fully address the issue of energy import dependency. Taking into consideration the gas cut-offs during the Russian-Ukrainian dispute in 2009, the EU is forced to make other arrangements. And here Turkmenistan steps in due to the combination of a relatively low domestic consumption, world's fourth largest reserves of natural gas,¹² and approximately 546 million barrels in proven oil reserves, with possible reserves of up to 1.7 billion barrels on its Caspian shores.¹³ The British firm of Gaffney, Cline & Associates estimates the country's new hydrocarbon deposits at a minimum of six trillion cubic meters.¹⁴ In spite of some degree of international skepticism over these audit results, EU views Turkmenistan as one of the prospective suppliers for its future energy projects. This cooperation, however, brings in some concerns. A closer look at the human rights record in Turkmenistan and EU's reaction will lift up the curtain.

When the first Turkmen leader passed away in December 2006 his successor took steps to encourage optimism of international community and Turkmenistan's population for more open and democratic government. Reforms in education system (abolishing 9-year system adopted under the first president), return of pensions, social benefits as well as denouncement of the Turkmenbashi personality cult pushed up his ratings among population and boosted the interest of democratic states, especially the ones dependent on imported energy. Unfortunately, positive changes stopped when he realized his power in full.

Turkmen government demonstrates limited, if at all, interest in what international community thinks about human rights records in the country. The 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U.S. State Department states that Turkmenistan remains an authoritarian state with government committing serious abuses. The State Department points out lack of political and civil liberties, torture, detentions, arbitrary arrests, lack of free media and internet access, restrictions on religious freedom, on freedom of movement for some citizens, including increased restrictions on those intending to study abroad. Internet access remains controlled and limited, provided through 15 state-owned Internet cafés nationwide, politically sensitive sites remain blocked. In 2010, the government denied freedom of movement to more than 150 Turkmen students studying at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek. Deportation cases have become more frequent. The problem mainly touches the ethnic minorities: Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Russians. The ethnic Uzbeks are usually put before a choice of either changing their ethnicity and nationality to Turkmen, or being deported to Uzbekistan.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 47

¹¹ *Consumption of energy*, Statistics explained, September 2010

¹² 'Turkmen Oil and Natural Gas: The Viability of Delivering Prosperity to Global Markets' American University in Washington D.C. <<http://www1.american.edu/ted/turkmen.htm>>

¹³ United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, <<http://www.unece.org/operact/opera/sppled/tur.htm> >

¹⁴ *Gaffney Cline & Associates Reveals Turkmen Reserves Potential*, October 2008, retrived from Oil and Gas Insight <<http://www.oilandgasinsight.com/file/69910/gaffney-cline--associates-reveals-turkmen-reserves-potential.html>>

While EU strives to implement its energy policy to 2050, pushing more for renewable energy sources to limit its dependency from suppliers,¹⁵ it also adopted a policy towards closer cooperation with energy-rich Central Asian (CA) states to secure EU strategic interests and to improve the situation with human rights and rule of law in CA.¹⁶ Given EU's dependent situation, it is forced to seek ways of diversifying supplies. Complementarily, Turkmenistan recently has also shown more interest in export diversification and saw cooperation with Western and Chinese companies as alternatives to Russian export market. Turkmenistan government even voiced its willingness to reserve up to 10 bcm of gas for Europe each year and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Energy Partnership with European Commission in April 2008. Intensifying relations with Turkmenistan put EU in a rather complicated situation: it should combine energy interests with promoting democratic and human rights values. One of the vivid results of the Central Asia Strategy has been the establishment of a structured Human Rights Dialogue process with all Central Asian states. However the Annual Human Rights Dialogues with Turkmen authorities held since 2008, for instance, demonstrate little real progress in this realm¹⁷. Nevertheless, an Interim EU-Turkmenistan Trade Agreement (ITA) entered into force last August¹⁸ and is soon to be replaced by a broader Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 2011 started with new attempts from EU to get closer to Turkmenistan. On 14-15 January, the EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, accompanied by EU Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger, visited Turkmenistan. Official Press Release from the European Commission clearly shows avoidance of human rights issues with main focus made on energy relations and discussion of safe issues, "including deeper cooperation in the fields of education and research, support for economic and social reforms, training/capacity building in legal areas and others as well as water and environment issues."¹⁹

Despite heavy criticism from many international organizations and independent experts,²⁰ EU seems to be learning the lesson of "blaming and shaming" policy ineffectiveness, and opting for the strategy of milder criticism of the repressive regime and avoidance of uneasy issues to secure its economic relations.

As long as the oppressive regime in Turkmenistan is fed by hydrocarbons' inflows, it is very unlikely that the ruling elite will ease its control over resources and voluntarily go for regime changes. A more aggressive EU criticism is not only useless, as it will bring no tangible results, but it is also damaging to the still fragile EU-Turkmenistan cooperation. On the contrary, a milder and balanced approach combining social projects and human rights improvement support with economic cooperation seem the only possible way to gradually increase EU's influence on Turkmenistan.

¹⁵ *EU Energy Policy to 2050 - Achieving 80-95% emissions reductions* A report by the European Wind Energy Association, March 2011

¹⁶ *European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership October 2007*, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION GENERAL SECRETARIAT

¹⁷ *EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue: EU Should Call for Concrete Steps to Improve Civil Society Situation in Turkmenistan*, 16 July 2011, Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, International Partnership for Human Rights, the Netherlands Helsinki Committee

¹⁸ European Parliament resolution of 22 April 2009 on the Interim Trade Agreement with Turkmenistan

¹⁹ *EU Commission President Barroso visits Turkmenistan*, The European Commission Press Release 17 January 2011

²⁰ *All that gas? Five reasons why the European Union is wrong to bow to the dictatorship of Turkmenistan*. November 2009, Global Witness Briefing

Results of the Kazakh Chairmanship in the OSCE: The Human Dimension

Ailuna Utegenova '05, Instructor, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

Opponent: Parvina Abduvakhobova '07, Programme Manager, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Almaty, Kazakhstan

In 2003, Kazakhstan made the application to chair the OSCE during 2009. The discussion on Kazakhstan's application was long and complicated. Finally, at the end of 2007 at the Madrid Meeting of the Ministerial Council, it was decided that Kazakhstan would chair the OSCE in 2010. Kazakhstan's implementation of obligations in the human dimension was a point of significant contention in discussions among the OSCE participating states. While the candidacy of Kazakhstan was supported by a group of the CIS countries, a number of the Western countries, such as the USA and Great Britain, called into question Kazakhstan's level of democratization and urged to postpone the Kazakh chairmanship.

The question of chairmanship also caused a big discussion inside the country. A number of oppositional movements opposed the application for chairmanship and urged the Western countries to support their position, noting the country's problems in the human dimension. The Kazakh government's official position was that the chairmanship in the OSCE would promote the further modernization of political system.

In this respect, the following two questions are examined in the paper:

1. How did chairmanship in the OSCE affect domestic policy of the country in the field of democratization, respect of human rights and maintenance of the rule of law?
2. What contribution to the development of the OSCE human dimension was made by the Kazakh Chairmanship?

Achieving the positive decision on chairmanship became a priority of the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs' activities during 2007. At Madrid Ministerial Council in November 2007, the Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Marat Tazhin stressed "we set grand-scale political modernization tasks. While implementing the program of democratic reforms, the OSCE and its institutions' recommendations are duly taken into account".

A large part of the Minister's speech at the Madrid meeting outlined a plan for political modernization of the country in the context of the future chairmanship, covering obligations on improving the legislation on political parties, media, reforming of local self-government system.

To what extent has the Kazakh government fulfilled its Madrid obligations? According to the Freedom House's review of Kazakhstan's performance of the OSCE obligations of promoting democracy and the rule of law, Kazakhstan has not carried out sufficiently the Madrid obligations in the field of democratization of its political system. The authors of the review come to a conclusion that the situation in the country demands more than simple amendments; moreover, it needs the conceptual revision of all current legislation of Kazakhstan concerning legal regulation of the fundamental political rights and freedoms.

Holding the presidential elections became the most important political event in Kazakhstan after chairing the OSCE. By the invitation of the Kazakh Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the ODIHR deployed an Election Observation Mission for the 3 April presidential election. The Mission came to conclusion that the Kazakh government still needed to address a number of the ODIHR key recommendations in holding elections.

Regarding the question of how the chairmanship in the OSCE affected the domestic policy of Kazakhstan in the human dimension, the following results can be pointed:

- The question of chairmanship promoted development of an intensive discussion of political problems among the government, political parties, NGOs in Kazakhstan;
- The problem of achieving a positive decision concerning chairmanship obliged the country's government to define a wide-ranging agenda for political reforms. The address of the Kazakh

- Minister of Foreign Affairs Marat Tazhin at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid in 2007 represented a complex of obligations on advancing the process of democratization in the country;
- It is necessary to notice that Kazakhstan has undertaken certain efforts on improvement of the legislation on elections, political parties, and the media. Therefore, it is possible to speak about certain productivity of chairmanship in the OSCE for the processes of democratization in the country. However, most of the legislation concerning the human dimension obligations still needs to be improved in order to comply with the OSCE standards.

Opponent's remark: Freedom of expression remains restricted in Kazakhstan; Government has not decriminalized libel during its year in the OSCE; there is no statute of limitations on libel suits against journalists and civil penalties for allegations of defamation. Instead, journalists remain in prison for "publishing state secrets". For instance, Ramazan Esergepov – Editor-in-Chief of the "Alma-Ata Info" newspaper – is still in prison. He was sentenced to three years of prison for disclosing state secrets for publishing the article, "Who rules the country: President or NSC (National Security Committee)?"

- The opposition forces which in the beginning put hopes on the OSCE, considering it as a force able to affect the process of political modernization of Kazakhstan, later became disillusioned in its potential. The organization came to be considered as a weak, loose structure, and the chairmanship of Kazakhstan - an event that did not cause changes in domestic policy.

The second question of the paper consists in examining the Kazakh chairmanship's contribution to the development of the OSCE human dimension. At the moment of decision-making on the Kazakh chairmanship, there were fears that as the chairman Kazakhstan would support weakening ODIHR's mandate. However, at the Madrid Meeting Minister Tazhin underlined that Kazakhstan would support the preservation of ODIHR's mandate, and would not support any future attempts to weaken it.

The following results of the Kazakh Chairmanship's contribution to development of the OSCE human dimension can be pointed:

- Kazakhstan stressed that the human dimension also included the issues of ethnicity, national policies and religious policy. As a result, the Kazakh chairmanship focused on the issues of religious tolerance and freedom of religion in the human dimension.

Opponent's remark: During its OSCE chairmanship, the country continued to promote religious intolerance. The association uniting 18 "anti-sect" NGOs founded and financed by the government actively operated. Moreover, a textbook on religious studies in the secondary schools was published. The textbook opposes "traditional" religions – Islam and Russian Orthodox Church - to "non-traditional" religious confessions and movements. The current Law "On freedom of belief and religious associations", aimed at strengthening national security, includes numerous restrictions of freedom of conscience and religion that do not meet international standards as they admit discrimination and inequality under the law for the reasons of religion and belief; limitations regarding registration of religious organizations.

- As a Chairman-in-Office, Kazakhstan has not made any proposals on changing the ODIHR mandate. The chairmanship of a country that was part of a group of states which repeatedly criticized the OSCE institutions in the human dimension, has had a considerable importance in strengthening dialogue within the Organization;
- Convening the OSCE summit in Astana after 11 years of Istanbul summit was certainly of great importance. It is very interesting that the Astana Commemorative Declaration contains the provision that "the participating states reaffirm categorically and irrevocably that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned."

Opponent's remark: The government of Kazakhstan continued their efforts to create obstacles for real civil society in the country by creating so-called GONGOs (Government-Operated Non-Governmental Organisations)

participating in OSCE and ODIHR events with two main purposes: praising or glossing the government's image, and reporting on the actions of their colleagues. This was and still remains a challenge for both local and international NGOs trying to attract attention to human rights challenges in Kazakhstan. Many civil society organizations were concerned that during its Chairmanship, the mandate of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) would be threatened by Kazakhstan. However, thanks to the pressure from participating states it did not happen.

One year chairmanship in the OSCE was just a short time to implement radical political reforms in the country. It should be noted that the chairmanship in the OSCE was not only an important foreign policy event for Kazakhstan, but it also affected the development of the internal political debate on the issues of further political modernization of the country.

Opponent's remark: Contrary to some expectations, the human rights situation in Kazakhstan did not improve before or during 2010. In fact, several reports on monitoring of the chairmanship year describe how the situation has remained the same or even worsened in some cases. In the conclusion, it is needless to say that giving the chairmanship of the OSCE to Kazakhstan should not only be considered as a diplomatic gain for the country; it should have rather shown a genuine political will in the country to bring some democratic changes in the leading economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

PANEL 3: Economic and Environmental Dimension

Development of water-power engineering as a base of steady development of Central Asia

Rustam Karimov '05, Chairman, Scout Association of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, Tajikistan

Opponent: Dastanbui Mamadsaidov '07, Sales and Marketing Head, Pamir Energy Company, Khorog, Tajikistan

Energy sources of Central Asia

At the present time Central Asia has significant stocks of various kinds of power resources: natural minerals such as petroleum, gas, coal, slates, and renewed resources such as water, energy of the sun, and wind.

Unfortunately the exact data on stocks of natural minerals is not available. "The published estimates of power riches of the region vary widely, especially concerning petroleum and gas. So, the share of the Central Asian petroleum in global reserves varies from 0,8% to 5%, on gas - from 3% to 5 %, on uranium - from 19,7% to 30 %".²¹ At the same time, renewed energy sources are on the surface, and their availability allows doing more authentic calculations. On the basis of the published data, the countries of the Central Asian region have significant potential for solar, wind and water-power engineering, but their part in the general energy manufacture of Central Asia so far (except for water-power engineering) is very small, totaling about 0,1 %. The reasons are big capital intensity; shortage and insufficient qualification of the technical, scientific and engineering staff; and high costs of technology.

The main used source of renewed energy on the territory of Central Asia is water, or hydroelectric power stations. The sources are the pools of Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. The expediency of use of wind and solar energy in Central Asia is economically justified mainly in settlements which are removed from the basic systems of the central power supply (hills, steppes, deserts) where delivery of electric power results in its significant loss, and also in the sphere of small business: farms, 'bed & breakfast' hotels, roadside cafes, etc.

Water-powering potential of Central Asia

The majority of scientists converge in the opinion that the only kind of worthwhile and realistic production of energy would be through the renewable means of energy.

Nowadays, water-power engineering is the only renewed power resource justified for Central Asia. The stocks accessible for development at the present moment exceed the current level of consumption in our region 3.5 times.

Tajikistan has almost 4% of the world's hydropower potential, with 530 billion kilowatt-hours per year (kWh/year) potential. Kyrgyzstan holds the third place in the CIS (after the Russian Federation and Tajikistan) in hydropower production. With an estimated potential of 142 billion kWh per year, it has been utilizing less than 10% of that to date. Other countries of Central Asia (except for Turkmenistan) are also in possession of significant potential and actual production of hydropower: Kazakhstan has an estimated potential of 170 billion kWh/year, of which 23.5 billion kWh/year is economically efficient to develop, and Uzbekistan has a total potential of 88.5 billion kWh/year, of which 27.45 billion kWh/year is actually realizable. Thus, according to these estimates, the total hydroelectric energy potential of the Central Asian states makes up 937 billion kWh per year.²²

Prospects and ways of its achievement

Use of the full energy potential of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers would give significant opportunities for the economic growth not only of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but also of the downstream

²¹ Edward Poletaev, "Energetic potential of the Central Asia: problems, tendencies and prospects", Investment risks in Central Asia, December 28, 2007.

²² <http://www.energo-info.ru/content/view/3689/108/>

countries. It would create all the conditions for more effective utilization of agricultural and industrial potential of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

With modernization of the systems of agriculture and irrigation in the downstream countries, transition to modern agrarian technologies, and rational water use with full regulation of the drains of Amu Darya and Syr Darya, it would be possible to save up to half of the drain of these rivers per year. Today, the outdated agrarian technologies use 3 to 10 times more water per unit of production than the global standards. For the safety of the region and power independence, it is also necessary to create (or restore) a common regional power system, thereby securing a reliable energy market within Central Asia.

The increase of the water-power production in the Central Asian region would mean an increase of the volumes electricity production overall, which would mean access to cheaper electric power for the population; effective and rational usage of water resources through regulation of water drains in the water basins by hydroelectric power stations; and reduction of use of the natural non-renewable minerals (petroleum, gas, coal), and hence, reduction of anthropogenic climate impact, including pollution of ground and emissions from Thermal Power Stations.

The further potential benefits from increase of manufacture of water-power engineering in Central Asia include the strengthening of power safety of the region; development of industry and economic progress; strengthening of the international authority of the Central Asian region; and trade and other economic relations through delivery of affordable energy to neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and others.

In order to achieve the above listed benefits, a number of steps need to be taken. The first step is the maximal use of the hydropower potential of Central Asia. The next step is satisfaction of interests in getting new technology producers of water-power engineering. Third, development of the "real" complex program of maintenance of energy needs of the Central Asian states, including delivery of petroleum, gas, coal, and the electric power. There should also be a joint discussion of questions of strategic reserves and energy saving as well as joint solution of issues of strategic resources and conservations. Another important step is the financial participation and comprehensive support of the downstream countries in realization of projects of construction of hydroelectric power station of all kinds in the upstream countries. This should be followed by the active propagation of the necessity of regional integration in the energy sector, the prospects of future use and benefits of water-power engineering for all countries through all mass media, at all levels, and in all countries of the region. This will help to create a public opinion for the benefit of development of water-power engineering, and liquidation of imaginary fears and prejudices about construction of large hydropower units on the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. The last step, but not the least, is political cooperation for good safety transit of the electric power.

It is necessary to focus on the question of a joint development of water-power engineering as the basis for the future steady development of all countries in the region; after all, the power supply sources are the basis for any development and progress. Joint construction of the hydropower complexes on the internal rivers of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will help increase development of the water-power energy, adjust dumps of water for irrigation and other non-energy uses, to combine power resources in winter time, and the saved natural energy resources to use in the industry for manufacturing of other necessary materials, such as medicines, clothes, plastic, etc.

Regional joint projects are the important factor in removal of adversity and fears between neighbors in the given questions, and will have favorable effects on steady development of the peoples of Central Asia and on stability in the region.

Opponent's remark: While discussing the development of the water-power engineering the author missed an important aspect – the climate change. Climate change is expected to exacerbate further water scarcity in the region and the problems of the Aral Sea. Rising temperatures are already melting 46 of Central Asia's glaciers. The Pamir-Alai glaciers lost 19% their mass during the second half of the 20th century; glacier coverage in various parts of the Tien Shan, Gissaro-Alai, Pamir, Dzhungarskiy, and Zailiyskiy Alatau mountains is currently shrinking at the average rate of about 1% annually. This melting will ultimately reduce water flow into the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers by up to 40 and 30%, respectively. Increasing frequency of droughts and reduced agricultural productivity are also widely predicted.

On a different note, there was a note on construction of as many hydropower plants as possible in the upstream countries (TJ, KG), however would that not lead to the problem similar to the one that Nepal had? All of Nepal's truck routes pass through the territory of India. In the mid-1990s, when Nepal attempted to get support from the international community for the construction of several hydropower plants upstream on the river Ganges, bypassing cooperation with India, India introduced restrictive measures on transport links with Nepal. The transportation sanctions introduced by India had serious negative impact on social conditions in Nepal, and forced it to abandon the hydropower projects.

The Impact of Environment Security Initiative in Central Asia: Project on Radioactive Waste Management

Akmaljon Abdullayev '05, Project Assistant, UNDP, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Opponent: Dastanbui Mamadsaidov '07, Sales and Marketing Head, Pamir Energy Company, Khorog, Tajikistan

There is a growing understanding that the destruction and over-exploitation of natural resources and ecosystems can threaten the security of communities and nations. Competition over declining natural resources such as forests, fresh water, fisheries or fertile soils, exacerbated by impacts of climate change and migratory movements of population, is a threat to stability and peace. Similarly, trans-boundary pollution or environmental accidents and disasters with cross-border consequences often negatively affect the relations between neighboring states.

However, common problems regarding the use of natural resources may also bring people together in a positive manner. Communities and nations can build confidence with each other through joint efforts to improve the state and management of natural resources. Environmental cooperation can thereby act as an important tool for preventing conflicts and promoting peace between communities. For this reason, starting from 2003, the OSCE together with the REC, UNDP, UNECE, UNEP, and NATO established the Environment Security Initiative (ENVSEC) partnership initiative that addresses environmental and security challenges in four regions including Central Asia.²³

The thematic focus of ENVSEC – the interaction between environmental degradation and conflict – remains highly relevant and is likely to gain in strategic importance, and the initiative remains unique as an innovative partnership of agencies offering an integrated response to environment and security challenges. The initiative recognizes that the best way to address environmental and security concerns is through prevention, international dialogue and neighborly cooperation. The Initiative assists governments and communities to identify common solutions and develop joint projects for achieving them, and facilitates dialogue and collaboration among policy makers, environmental experts, and the civil society across the borders, including national experts, ministries and national agencies, as well as NGOs and research institutes.

There are 43 projects in the Central Asia portfolio of ENVSEC, out of a total 159 projects. In addition to radiation safety, the initiative has been dealing with such issues as trans-boundary water resources management, dam safety, industrial accidents, adaptation to climate change, capacity building and assessments of river basins.²⁴ I have been involved in "Strengthening Coordination of Project Formulation and Mobilization of Resources for Sustainable Radioactive Waste Management in Central Asia" project implemented by the UNDP and therefore interested in exchanging ideas about vision of the initiative from the ground through my project. The list of ENVSEC projects in Central Asia and relevant map of the region has been delivered to participants for information.

The problem of uranium tailings and toxic industrial waste in CA countries remains extremely serious²⁵ and the potential consequences of paying inadequate attention to this problem could affect millions of people and delay solving the problem for many decades. In the recent past Central Asian countries were important sources of uranium and rare metals in the USSR. Large-scale uranium ore mining and processing and nuclear weapons testing for the Soviet military-industrial complex led to an enormous amount of radioactive waste in the region, the overwhelming majority of which was placed in mining waste dumps and tailings sites. Most of these tailings are located in areas prone to earthquakes,

²³ NATO became an associated member in 2004 while UNECE and REC joined the initiative starting from 2006

²⁴ For detailed information about the history of ENVSEC involvement and approach to Central Asia see Revised Draft Background Paper: Environment and Security: A Framework for Cooperation in Europe. January 8, 2002 available at http://envsec.org/publications/Environment%20and%20Security.%20A%20framework%20for%20cooperation%20in%20Europe.%20Draft%20background%20paper_January%202002.pdf

²⁵ Over 800 million tons of waste from mining and processing radioactive ores is stored on tailings sites and in mining waste dumps of functioning and abandoned uranium mines in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

landslides and floods. In addition, these sites are situated in water-catchment areas, often in the basins and valleys of trans-boundary rivers. A number of research and assessment projects (e.g., ENVSEC assessment of Ferghana Valley, 2005) point to the high risk of contamination spreading along the water course to the entire Ferghana Valley and beyond.²⁶ Many tailings are also located close to cities, populated areas and state borders of the Central Asian countries.

From the very outset, ENVSEC identified radioactive waste sites as an environmental issue of high concern with potentially disastrous security consequences for Central Asia. Since 2010, therefore, the project team, with the support of UNDP office in Kyrgyzstan and other UNDP offices in the region, has been taking measures to achieve the following goals²⁷:

- support governments in creating a coherent portfolio of projects aimed at mitigating various aspects of radioactive waste;
- liaise with governments of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and others; and
- mobilize and coordinate donor responses.

So far we have held national round tables in each participating state and a regional meeting in Bishkek on 13 December 2010. During the latter meeting, all member states adopted the Regional Action Plan to ensure that prioritized project proposals on radiation safety are formulated by the member states and implemented in a consistent and coherent way. The member states also agreed to focus on six project proposals on remediation and link them with other supporting projects.

At the national level, internal and external resources are being mobilized. The finalized proposals will have to be endorsed by the IAEA Technical Cadres at the IAEA's meeting at the end of September 2011. Six draft concept notes have been submitted to the German and Japanese governments. The execution of these projects will include private sector participation. Of relevance for the future, the execution plans include an "innovative idea" of extracting ammonium fertilizers from the radioactive waste tailings at Boordu.

Despite the 2010 events and the loss of political momentum, a lot has been going on at the technical level. However, to regain momentum in the period of 2011–2012, and to achieve the master objective, the project personnel needs to work even harder in order to achieve relevant sub-objectives, including:

- Strengthen the capacities of the governmental entities that manage uranium tailings in a number of Central Asian countries;
- Nurture relationship with IAEA;
- Strengthen the Central Asian alliance at both the political and technical levels;
- Navigate the complicated traditional donor structures and relationships with the three fundamental objectives in mind (see above);
- Getting non-traditional donors on board and in line, e.g., Russia, EURASEC; and
- Intensified resource mobilization campaigns.

Finally, all of this would be in vain without an intensive follow-up of the donors after the Round Table conference that is planned for the end of 2011. So far the cooperation of participating states has been significant in dealing with radioactive waste, which meets the goals of ENVSEC in general. Such partnership mechanism has shown the best practice of engagement in Central Asia.

Opponent remark: The paper mainly reflects the contents of the project 'proposal' prepared by UNDP rather than an academic, researched assignment. It is too general, lacking specific statistics or sources referred, and has the

²⁶ For nexus of environment and security in Ferghana Valley, see report "Environment and Security: Transforming the risk into cooperation, Central Asia: Ferghana/Osh/Khujand area" 2005 available at [http://envsec.org/publications/ENVSEC.Transforming%20risks%20into%20cooperation.%20Central%20Asia.%20Ferg hana-Osh-Khujand%20area_English.pdf](http://envsec.org/publications/ENVSEC.Transforming%20risks%20into%20cooperation.%20Central%20Asia.%20Ferg%20hana-Osh-Khujand%20area_English.pdf)

²⁷ The Project Coordination Unit is based in Bishkek, with representatives in Astana, Dushanbe and Tashkent. For detailed information on the project, see: <http://uranium-ca.org/en/about-us/about-project>

feeling of an excerpt taken from a report's executive summary. It would be desirable to see the author's own views, perspectives and conclusions on the matter in a less technical and more critical manner.

The introduction does not bring forth any elements to better understand the impact of Environment Security Initiative in Central Asia. The author does not offer any original description, analysis or interpretation. There is no indication that the researcher spoke to any knowledgeable people about the impact of Environment Security Initiative in Central Asia in particular.

The project components in each of the Central Asian republics indicates only the area of coverage by the project, however no indication of the roles of those countries – their contribution to the control or elimination of radioactive waste in their areas.

Any descriptive statistics about the effect of the radioactive waste on the local population would be interesting to see, including data on the level of sickness broken down into effects on males, females, and children, for example.

The paper raises a number of items that need attention, such as:

- Review of the Legislative and institutional Frameworks;*
- Preparation of Health impact assessments;*
- Preparation of the Socio-economic impact assessment;*
- Review of remediation options as indicated in the TACIS project;*
- Assessment with respect to Remediation work (Relocation); Infrastructure: roads, bridges, etc; Rehabilitation of the relocated site; and*
- A monitoring program.*

Adequately covering any – let alone all – of these items appears to be almost an insurmountable task.