THE OSCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A SIMULACRUM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS?

A Thesis
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by
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

How to explain the existence of international organizations (IOs) that have not achieved the objectives assigned to them? Why do member States of such organizations continue supporting them financially or otherwise? These were the inquires in need of answers, which led to undertaking of this MA Thesis. To do so, this study scrutinizes the case of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and explores the reasons behind the continuing rhetoric of its officials and participating States (pS) on the OSCE’s role and significance in developing a security community, one of its key avowed objectives, elements of which can be found in the decisions of OSCE Summits of Heads of State or Government starting in 1990.

Using the concepts of “simulation and simulacrum” by Jean Baudrillard (1983; 1995), this study attempts to demonstrate that the real activities of the OSCE do not fully correspond to its official security community-building discourse. Content analysis of the OSCE documents and priorities for the Organization in 2011-2016, coupled with interviews involving OSCE staff members, representatives of the national delegations to the OSCE, and third party political experts backed the initial hypotheses of this Thesis that the objectives of the OSCE are not clearly defined, that its real activities do not fully contribute to the multilevel and multidimensional communication among its pS and do not necessarily correspond to the Organization’s security community-building rhetoric. This Thesis, therefore, concludes that the OSCE has become a “simulacrum,” a simulated model of an IO that in reality only minimally works on facilitating cooperation and formation of communication, mutual trust and understanding among its pS. The methodology and theoretical model employed to analyze the case of the OSCE provides a way to better understand modern international relations and the functioning of intergovernmental organizations. This Thesis demonstrates that the phenomenon of existing “ineffective” IOs is one worthy of study, with both academic and pragmatic benefits.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Thesis is a product of months of thorough work that could not have been done without external support. First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Mr Payam Foroughi, for his advice, guidance, and most of all, patience. My appreciation also extends to the OSCE Academy, an institution that has helped me to increase my research and intellectual potential and provided the necessary financial and logistical support to undertake an internship and collect the data for my Thesis at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria.

There are many people who deserve my thanks for their willingness to contribute in many ways to this Thesis. The staff members of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, and the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna were indispensable to this project. Most of them wish to remain anonymous. However, all deserve my sincere gratitude for their time, lengthy conversations, advice, and useful materials on the OSCE and its activities. I would also like to thank those political experts and representatives of the national delegations and missions to the OSCE for their readiness to share their opinions and views.

Finally, my eternal thanks, appreciation and love is extended to my family for their emotional support and understanding during my study at the OSCE Academy. I dedicate this Thesis to my husband, Yuriy Makubayev, who bore the burden of listening to my discussion and my theoretical approaches and reading the very first draft of this work.
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................. ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................. iii

ACRONYMS .................................................................................. v

I: INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1
   OSCE and Its Security Community-Building .................................. 2
   Research Question ........................................................................ 5
   Hypotheses .................................................................................. 5
   Research Methodology ............................................................... 6
   Research Significance ............................................................... 7
   Limitations and Delimitations .................................................... 8

II: WHAT IS SIMULATION OF SECURITY COMMUNITY-BUILDING? .... 9
   OSCE as an Object of Research ................................................ 9
   Theory of Security Community ................................................. 11
   “Hypocrisy,” “Virtual Politics” and “Simulation” ......................... 13
   Simulation of Security Community-Building: Theoretical Model ... 16

III: REALITY OF THE OSCE’S SECURITY COMMUNITY-BUILDING .... 18
   Does the OSCE Have Clearly Defined Objectives for the 21st Century? 18
   OSCE’s Security Community-building: Theory vs. Reality ............ 23
   OSCE as a “Simulacrum” in International Politics ....................... 30

IV: CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................... 33

REFERENCES ................................................................................ 37

APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS ................................................... 44
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>Deutsche Welle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDIM</td>
<td>Human Dimension Implementation Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>OSCE Permanent Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pS</td>
<td>OSCE participating States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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I

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the desert of the real.

—The Matrix (1999)

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, international organizations (IOs) have become increasingly significant for international politics. These institutions, rather than individual countries, have sought to establish rules, principles and standards of world order, cope with traditional and new challenges and build lasting peace and prosperity. It is widely believed and actively promoted that IOs play an important role in establishing cooperation, enhancing dialogue and mutual understanding among countries. They are also expected to join the efforts of their member States and partners in solving a wide range of problems and, thereby, contribute to international security and development. However, in today’s world, despite a plethora of intergovernmental bodies, poverty, starvation, terrible diseases, armed conflicts, political violence, wars and other disasters and ills still remain possible.

IOs frequently face criticism from mass media, scholars, ordinary people and even their own member States for being ineffective and unable to implement their intended goals. It would appear that an IO has everything to succeed: material and financial assets; numerous staff members; international experts and, therefore, access to the best practices and necessary knowledge; and, what is most important, the willingness of the member States to cooperate and address certain problems collectively and, to that end, to follow specific rules and plans. Yet a large number of IOs cannot achieve what they identify as their avowed objectives.

This raises a number of questions: Given that states are rational actors, why do they not get rid of or reform the IOs that are unable to perform their mandated functions? Why do member States continue to support ineffective IOs financially or otherwise? What is the reason behind the existence of such international organizations?
OSCE and Its Security Community-Building

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is one of those international bodies that have attracted a lot of criticism for its ineffectiveness and inability to influence significantly its area of operation, criticisms including from its own participating States (pS) and officials. For example, at the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, stated that the Organization needs to do more “to truly become a cooperative forum for security on the basis of democracy and freedom” (Trend 2010). At the same meeting, the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, declared that the OSCE had begun to “lose its potential” (DW 2010). Later, in 2012, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, expressed her concerns over the future of the OSCE and its core values (The Irish Times 2012). Most recently, in April 2016, the OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier acknowledged that the OSCE had failed “to ensure unconditional respect for the Helsinki principles” (OSCE 2016a, 2).

The OSCE traces its history back to the Cold War era when its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was established through the signing of the ‘Helsinki Final Act’ in August 1975. On 1 August of that year in Helsinki, Finland, after two years of negotiations, the Heads of State or Government representing 35 countries (including the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (U.S.) and all European states, except Albania), signed the Final Act of the CSCE (aka Helsinki Final Act). This document established a unique platform for direct political dialogue between the capitalist West and the communist Eastern bloc, a duality which had emerged after World War II, with the two remaining rivals until the end of the Cold War symbolized by the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991.

After the formation of the CSCE, its pS repeatedly met and discussed various security and human rights issues. The meetings continued despite the deterioration in relations between the Soviet-led Eastern bloc and the West caused by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, and the shooting down of the Korean Airlines flight 007 by the Soviet air defence in 1983 (Snyder 2010).

With the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in November 1990, a document that formally marked the end of the Cold War, the CSCE put
forward an initiative to institutionalize the ‘Helsinki Process’ to establish a more effective tool for responding to the new challenges facing Europe after the end of the Cold War (CSCE 1990). *De facto*, the CSCE was no longer a mere ‘conference’ but had evolved into a full-fledged IO. At the 1994 CSCE Summit in Budapest, Hungary, the U.S. proposed to rename the Conference to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This proposal was approved by other pS and came into force in 1995 (OSCE 2007).

Creation of new institutions was not the only achievement of the 1990 Paris Charter. The document states that “the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended” (CSCE 1990, 3) and that an “adherence to shared values and … common heritage” binds the pS (6). In the Charter, the CSCE pS had recognized the need to strengthen full cooperation and to act together to address security challenges they face and thereby gave new value to the Conference (and later the OSCE). The document, therefore, depicts the OSCE as a community of states united by certain principles and common goals rather than as a mere dialogue for “overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations, and … better mutual understanding,” as was specified in the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE 1975, 3).

With the 1999 Charter for European Security adopted at the 6th Summit of Heads of State or Government in Istanbul, OSCE pS went a step further, agreeing to create a “common and indivisible security space” and an “OSCE area free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security” (OSCE 1999, 1). However, the Astana Commemorative Declaration signed at the 7th OSCE Summit is the document in which pS refer to the term “security community” directly and agree that “the role of the OSCE [in creating an indivisible security community] remains crucial, and should be further enhanced” (OSCE 2010a, 2).

Though the 1990 Paris Charter already contained some ideas of an OSCE security community, the 2010 Astana Declaration has drawn the attention of the Organization’s leadership, pS representatives and experts to this issue. The Astana Summit and its final document have generated discussions on the failure of the OSCE to meet the goal of creating a security community among its pS. Indeed, theoretically, the OSCE should have generated the so-called “we-feeling” (Adler and Barnett 1998b, 8) among its pS, what would eventually result in mutual trust and peaceful development, as stated by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998a).
However, in the early 2000s, a group of post-Soviet pS accused the OSCE of “double standards,” meddling in their internal affairs and even discrimination (Epkenhans 2006, 213; Fawn 2013, 66). Initiated by the Russian Federation, this rhetoric against the OSCE and, in particular, its election observation missions led by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), found support from pS of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan and, later, Turkmenistan (ibid), thereby demonstrating the lack of mutual understanding and marking a new period of East-West division within the OSCE region. Aside from this, some observers were already arguing that in the post-Cold War era, the OSCE has become an organization with weak institutions (Dunay 2006). Coupled with the fact that there had been no meetings of heads of States of the OSCE pS since 1999, these problems resulted in the recognition that the “OSCE is in crisis” (7).

As a Chair of the Organization in 2010, Kazakhstan proposed and implemented the idea of a “commemorative Summit” of the OSCE. Despite the initial negative reception by the West and lack of enthusiasm from Kazakhstan’s closest ally, the Russian Federation, the Summit was held in Astana in early December 2010. But the atmosphere at the Summit was tense, and both the OSCE officials and pS leaders openly expressed their opinion that the Organization, indeed, faces a crisis. Petros Efthymiou, the president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the time, even told the delegates: “It is no secret that today the OSCE is facing an identity crisis” (EurasiaNet 2010).

The Ukraine crisis of 2014, chiefly the situation with Crimea, in turn, led to a new wave of political confrontations between the East, primarily Russia, and the West, made up of the U.S. and its European allies. This revealed that both sides are not ready to reach a convergence on the crucial European security issues and are willing to openly pit their different identities and ideas against one other. Some thinkers, including Mikhail Gorbachev, Noam Chomsky and Stephen Cohen, have proposed that a “new Cold War” is already upon us (RT 2015; Chomsky 2015; Cohen 2007). Given the ongoing violent conflict in eastern Ukraine, which is estimated to have caused over 9,000 casualties among civilians and soldiers since it began in April 2014 (Reuters 2016), this new crisis within the OSCE ‘security community’ appears to be far deeper than the past.
Despite such crises and the seeming inability of the OSCE to tackle them, there have been no suggestions to dissolve the Organization or any serious wishes by any of its pS to withdraw from it. In fact, the OSCE has experienced an increase in the number of its pS, most recently having admitted Mongolia as its 57th participating State (OSCE 2012b). The OSCE’s “Unified Budget,” in turn, has seen an increase from approximately €21 million in 1994 (OSCE 2007, 28) to €141 million in 2016 and the staff of the Organization consists of nearly 3,500 people throughout its sphere of operations in Europe and Asia (OSCE 2016d) scattered among its headquarters and institutions in Europe and its 17 field presences in Eurasia. It is also surprising that despite the often conflicting security and foreign policies of its pS, proving that the OSCE is unable to generate positive identification on key issues and mutual trust among its pS, the Organization has survived and continues its discourse on OSCE “co-operative and indivisible security community” and “shared OSCE area” (OSCE 2010a, 2).

Research Question

The strange modus vivendi of the OSCE characterised by the continued discourse on its significant role in building a security community, despite the Organization’s apparent inability to develop significant mutual trust and collective identity among its pS that pursue often conflicting security and foreign policies, points out several questions and begs examination as an empirical case-study. Using theoretical concepts of “simulation” and “simulacra” by Jean Baudrillard (1983; 1995) and the theory of security communities by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998a; 1998b), this Thesis aims at answering the following key question: What are the reasons behind the continuing existence of the OSCE in the post-Cold War era? In line with this general inquiry, the study also attempts to answer the following: How do the OSCE’s actual activities correspond to its discourse on strengthening cooperation and security community-building? How do OSCE pS perceive the Organization’s functions and appropriateness throughout its sphere of operation? And, how do these perceptions correspond to what the OSCE actually does?

Hypotheses

The following three hypotheses will be tested by this Thesis:

H1: While the CSCE’s raison d'être during the Cold War was the direct interaction and discussion of security issues between the communist
East and capitalist West, the objectives of the OSCE in the 21st century remain largely ambiguous.

**H2:** The real activities of the OSCE do not fully contribute to the direct multilevel and multidimensional communication among its pS that is necessary for the emergence of OSCE security community.

**H3:** The OSCE has become a ‘simulacrum,’ a simulated model of an international organization that largely gives the appearance—rather than the reality—of working on facilitating cooperation and formation of communication, mutual trust and understanding among its pS.

Overall, this Thesis attempts to demonstrate that the States that founded the OSCE and are involved in its activities constantly reconfirm their willingness to build a security community and achieve mutual trust and understanding but has not equipped the Organization with sufficient powers and authority. The OSCE, therefore, only simulates a security community-building entity and exists as an institutionalized discourse on cooperation and security-community building, thereby representing an example of Baudrillard’s simulacrum in international politics.

**Research Methodology**

To test the above hypotheses, this Thesis employs a combination of four qualitative methods: (i) **Content analysis** of the declarations and documents produced by the CSCE/OSCE Summits beginning from the Paris Charter of 1990 with the aim of revealing whether the OSCE has clearly stated objectives and the vision of how to achieve them. (ii) **Specialized interviews** involving staff members of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna to back the findings of the content-analysis and to understand what are the activities of the Organization and what it actually does to facilitate communication between its pS and develop a security community in the region.

Using Baudrillard’s concepts creates a challenging task – to operationalize simulacrum. In order to prove that the real is replaced by the model (simulacrum), this Thesis involves the (iii) **content analysis** of the documents stating the priorities of the OSCE Chairmanships after the 2010 Astana Summit where pS agreed to work together towards a security community in the OSCE area. It also uses (iv) **interviews** with representatives of permanent delegations and missions of OSCE pS to reveal their assessments of the OSCE’s activities in security community-building sphere.
The Thesis then compares the rhetoric presented in analysed documents and by the interviewed delegates with what the Organization really does. If the real activities do not correspond to the discourse, the OSCE is just a model created to hide the absence of security community-building; it is just a “simulacrum.”

In total, 15 interviews were conducted during the period of research, in addition to a number of informal email exchanges. Due to the nature of some questions posed, a large majority of interlocutors, including experts, staff members of OSCE field presences, and representatives of the national delegations to the OSCE requested to remain off the record. They, therefore, are cited as “interview with expert,” “interview with employee of OSCE field presence,” or “interview with representative of national delegation to the OSCE.” Those willing to speak on record are cited accordingly.

**Research Significance**

**First,** from a theoretical perspective, this Thesis is hoped to shed light on the issue of ‘simulation’ in international politics. With the example of the OSCE and its security community-building efforts, this Thesis will reveal that in the 21st century, political discourse rather than actual efforts has become a priority of international politics. As a result, international actors, which called upon to solve a certain problem, are captured by rhetoric and become unable to realize that their performed actions do not necessarily contribute much to the stated goals and, therefore, make a limited contribution to the solution of existing problems.

**Second,** this Thesis allows for the revealing of specific issues pertaining to the functioning of the OSCE as a whole and its field operations in particular. In the future, practitioners can use this information to assess and potentially reform the Organization’s activities at the local, regional, and international levels. **Third,** this research is particularly timely given the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, held in 2015. It thus reflects on the developments of the four decades that have followed the establishment of the CSCE/OSCE and considers the role that the Organization plays in contemporary international policy space. And **forth,** the Thesis sheds light on the progress in security community-building, the core message of the Astana Commemorative Declaration adopted in 2010.
Limitations and Delimitations

(i): Due to the limited time frame and lack of opportunity for travelling and conducting research in all OSCE structures and field presences, this thesis chooses to look at the three cases—OSCE Centre in Bishkek, OSCE Programme Office in Astana and OSCE Secretariat in Vienna—with the caveat that these particular cases cannot necessarily provide a full picture of the OSCE’s security community-building activities.

(ii): In addition, given that the research rests on the analysis of descriptive data, there may be scope for observer bias. The conclusions, therefore, can be said to depend on the interpretations given by the author and can thus be subjective.

(iii): The selected methodology, in particular, in-depth interviews with representatives of the pS under study, depends on the availability of officials and the frankness of their responses, by way of official rhetoric vs. real positions and willingness of State representatives to openly respond to the questions posed.
II
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL MODEL OF SIMULATION
OF SECURITY COMMUNITY-BUILDING

OSCE as an Object of Research
As David J. Galbreath (2007) notes, “many in Western Europe and North America have forgotten about the OSCE” (xiv) overlooking the fact that it is worth to be studied. He realized this while working on a book devoted to the Organization: people had no idea about the OSCE when he was mentioning it as an object of his research. The only thing that mistakenly came to their minds when Galbreath was pronouncing this abbreviation was “the OECD” (xiv)—the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, a Paris-based IO assisting governments in overcoming economic and social challenges of globalization.

Despite the ignorance of the general public of the OSCE, there still are researchers interested in studying the Organization. Normally, these existing researches pay attention to the most significant events in the life of the Organization, such as the Astana Summit (Kushkumbayev 2010; Serik 2010; Zagorski 2010; Zellner 2010) or the Helsinki+40 Process launched to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act to discuss the Organization’s achievements and make recommendations on its reformation (Peško 2013; Tanner 2014; Usmanov 2014; Fouérer 2015). Scholars have also focused on certain areas of OSCE activities, especially so with regards to election observations (Mitchell 1995/1996; Eicher 2009; Eschenbächer and Knoll 2010) and field operations (Frowick 1995/1996; Lange 1997; Meyer 2000; Eiff 2008; Formisano and Tasiopoulou 2011; Mukhtorova 2013; Rybachenko 2016). Still, there is a dearth of studies looking at the OSCE as at a consistent organization with certain goals and activities designed to achieve those goals. In the words of Paul F. Fritch (2015), “the OSCE is dozens of different organizations” and researchers, therefore, “stick to their own lanes—for arms control specialists, the OSCE is … an arms control … organization; for human rights activists, it is a human rights organization; for others, it is … about combating trafficking, or police training, and so on” (42).
The scientific discussion on the OSCE as an IO for strengthening cooperation and building a security community of its pS intensified with the adoption of the 2010 Astana Declaration, though the OSCE Secretary General, Lamberto Zannier, had acknowledged that it was just “a more modern way of interpreting what the Helsinki spirit was” (Zannier 2011). Already in 1998, Emanuel Adler considered the OSCE as an influential IO whose “community-building practices” were adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (120). According to Adler, after the end of the Cold War, the OSCE began to focus on increasing “the interdependence and transactions between East and West and … transnational collective understanding” (121).

More recently, scholars have had different views on the OSCE’s security community-building efforts and their effectiveness. Daniel Warner (2013), for example, links the apparent success in the cooperation among OSCE pS with the motivation of each individual country. Thus, according to Warner, the OSCE pS have to be convinced that “international cooperation is more effective than domestic policies or joint work with other organizations” (158). A group of experts, including Sultan Akimbekov (2010), Wolfgang Zellner (2013; 2015), and Marcel Peško (2015) use the Realist approach when analyzing the activities of the OSCE, arguing that confrontation in Europe and conflicting interests of pS resulted in the OSCE’s failure to achieve the goals of the 2010 Astana Declaration. In turn, Sanat Kushkumbayev (2013), Irina Chernykh (2013), and Wolfgang Richter (2015) hold the Constructivist view and assume that the OSCE cannot meet the security expectations raised in Astana because Western countries and post-Soviet pS have diverging perceptions and ideas on security, cooperation and the meaning of the OSCE, itself.

Almost six years have passed since the adoption of the Astana Declaration, yet the debate on its progress centres mostly on simple acknowledging that its goals, as well as the goals of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, “are far from having been achieved” (Zarudna 2015, 25). Although scholars have attempted to explain the failure of the OSCE to build trust and understanding among its pS, their argumentation is normally limited to the confirmation that the pS have different and sometimes mutually exclusive interests or narratives and views on international politics, cooperation and the Organization itself. Those experts, therefore, overlook
the fact that the 2010 Astana Declaration is supposed to have been called upon by OSCE pS to overcome this divergence, build a security community and, thereby, contribute to peace and security in the OSCE region.

It is also surprising that experts on the OSCE do not question what the reason behind its existence and continuing discourse on its role in security community-building is, given that states have conflicting interests and differing views on security and cooperation and that the Organization has failed to overcome these challenges. ‘How it can be that states, which are considered to be rational actors, continue supporting the OSCE financially and otherwise and do not wish to leave it?’, one may ask.

**Theory of Security Community**

Three schools of thought, in particular, provide closer examination and analysis of the issue of security communities and organizations: Realism, Neo-liberalism, and Constructivism. **Realists** argue that states seek to maintain international stability and balance of power to ensure their security and survival, or as John Mearsheimer (2008) puts it: “to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order” (55). According to this perspective, states can achieve their security objectives either by increasing their military capabilities or by establishing military alliances. Realists contend that all alliances are temporary and states cannot trust each other because they act in terms of their own interests. Realism, however, cannot explain the long existence of organizations, such as the OSCE, that aim at building a security community encompassing actors who, in theory, are to balance against each other in international politics—namely Russia and the U.S. (Smith 2015).

According to the **Neo-liberal** school of international relations, the reduced costs of communications and intensified economic and trade relations among countries result in what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2000) refer to as “complex interdependence” (115). This concept implies an ideal world where societies use multiple channels to contact each other, state goals are not arranged in any hierarchy, and since the cost of using military force has increased because of close economic interdependence, military violence as means of achieving one’s aims may be ineffective and discouraging. States, therefore, claim neo-liberals, do not expect each other to use military force within security communities protected and supported by
international institutions. This is in line with the “democratic peace theory” arguing that “liberal democracies are uniquely willing to eschew the use of force in their relations with one another” (quoted in Burchill 2005, 56).

Bearing in mind the neo-liberal logic of economic interdependence being a basis for a security community, there is a need to analyze to what extent OSCE pS depend on each other economically. Table 1 displays that, for example, trade relations in the OSCE area are not evenly developed: The EU, for example, trades more within the Union and with the U.S. and Canada than with the Western Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Thus, economic interdependence between some countries within the OSCE (for example, within the EU or between the EU and the U.S.) is higher than between others (as in the case of EU-Canada, EU-Western Balkans, and EU-CIS excluding Russia).

**Table 1.** Merchandise trade between the EU and certain states and regions in the OSCE area in 2015 (billion euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intra-EU28</th>
<th>EU-U.S.</th>
<th>EU-Canada</th>
<th>EU-Western Balkans</th>
<th>EU-CIS</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>3 066,6</td>
<td>656,6</td>
<td>63,5</td>
<td>40,7</td>
<td>290,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(including the trade with the Russian Federation – 209,6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat (2016) and the European Commission (2016a; 2016b)

The Neo-liberal theorists also do not provide the answer to the question of how significant the economic interdependence between States should be to ensure mutual trust and understanding, emergence of a security community and peaceful development. For example, in 2014, Russia was the EU’s third largest partner while the EU represented the region, which handled around 50 per cent of Russia’s foreign trade (Liuhto 2015, 993). As demonstrated by the crisis in and around Ukraine, this interdependence between the Russian Federation and the EU was not enough to deter them from political confrontation and economic sanctions against each other. Therefore, Neo-liberalism alone cannot fully explain the OSCE’s existence as a security community-building structure.

**Constructivism** is an alternative to the materialistic rationalist theories of international relations and focuses on ideas and meanings to understand the phenomena that realists and liberals cannot fully explain (Hurd 2008). According to
Adler and Barnett (1998b), a “security community” is more complicated than an alliance, as it encompasses the states that share common identity and values, and have direct relations in different realms based on the principle of reciprocity (15). These conditions establish a collective identity and mutual trust that prevent States from using force against one another (17). According to Pal Dunay (2006), however, the OSCE suffers from a new East-West de facto division, it being a “divide between values” (15). Therefore, Constructivism, by itself, also cannot fully explain the empirical puzzle of the continued existence of the OSCE encompassing states with different identities and its discourse on security community.

None of the three dominant traditions in international relations can explain the existing empirical puzzle of the continued presence and expansion of the OSCE in the post-Cold War era. There is thus a need to find an alternative theoretical approach that can reveal the reasons behind the desire of the 57 pS of the OSCE to continue to support the Organization and remain in it despite internal problems and apparent ineffectiveness of its security community-building efforts.

“Hypocrisy,” “Virtual Politics” and “Simulation”

As Catherine Weaver (2003) notes, “hypocrisy, or discernible gaps between the official ‘speech’ and actions of an organization is quite common” (57-58). She argues that IOs are prone to use rhetoric to create a certain image and, thereby, obtain the resources and legitimacy necessary for their survival. At the same time, the realization of this rhetoric can be incompatible with the internal organizational culture that provides stability and efficiency of the structure encompassing a great number of staff and often nothing more. When such inconsistency emerges, organizations fall into a “hypocrisy trap” which it is “easy to fall into and hard to get out of” (Weaver 2008, 8). What Weaver overlooks is the behaviour of states that clearly understand the existence of this “hypocrisy” and still continue to support the organization politically and financially, through their discourse or otherwise. How real is the desire of States to achieve the avowed IO’s goals and why does a State remain in an IO, such as the OSCE, despite massive shortcomings?

The idea that there are no objective facts comes from the works of postmodernist philosophers, including Michel Foucault, who tried “to deal with reality through ... things which are always—[or] often—far from reality” (Dillon and
Foucault 1980, 4). According to postmodernist theory, instead of objective knowledge, different “discourses” exist and serve as the instrument “by which there is struggle” for power (Foucault 1981, 53). Each discourse is a set of narratives; each carries equal weight, without any hierarchy among them. As the debates about which narrative is closer to the truth are meaningless for postmodernists as Foucault, one must deconstruct each rhetoric to reveal the real power interest behind them (Berger and Zijderveld 2009, 56).

Nearly a decade ago, Andrew Wilson (2005) introduced the concept of “virtual politics” to the study of post-Soviet space. This approach attempts to distinguish between the observable political actions and their concealed meanings and goals. Wilson uses the examples of Ukraine, Belarus and Putin’s Russia to demonstrate how ruling elites of the post-Soviet countries retain their political power and hinder democratic process. He argues that in some countries “the effort [to democratize] has never really been made” (xiii). Instead, the authorities falsify the whole electoral process by creating fake opposition parties and candidates, monopolize communication, and manage a “virtual” reality to portray a false image of democratic rule. Politics in these countries, therefore, represents a theatrical narrative that “does not relate to reality, [but] … becomes it” (34).

Wilson depicts the virtual reality created by skilled elites of authoritarian, undemocratic and semi-democratic states to manipulate political processes in their country as something that lacks reality. The falsified participants of this process are presented to the public as television projects that cease to exist when off the air. According to Wilson, “virtual politics” represents “a series of designer projects, rather than … a real pattern of representation and accountability” (39). Yet, political technologists cannot fully realize their project and “shape the whole world in their own image” (46). Thus, there are innumerous opposition movements (real and also virtual) in these countries, but often too weak (or simply phony) to trigger a rapid transition to democracy.

Other scholars have interpreted ‘virtual politics’ as a phenomenon that exists on both domestic and international levels, and which can be of use to post-Soviet ruling elites as well as other parts of the world. Thus, Baudrillard’s The Gulf War Did Not Take Place demonstrates that the use of force against Iraq in the early 1990s represented an excellent example of political and military “simulation” (1995, 46). It
was rather “disillusion … by means of information” than real war (68). Baudrillard states that while Saddam Hussein bombed the Iraqi civilian targets himself to create an impression that the U.S. conducted “a dirty war,” the Americans controlled and reinterpreted information to provide an image of “a clean war,” one where there are no Iraqi civilian casualties and few losses among the American military (62).

If Baudrillard is claiming that the 1991 Gulf War between the U.S.-led coalition and Iraq was not a real war, it is because, firstly, there were rare direct military clashes between the Iraqi army and the allied forces and, secondly, it did not take place primarily in the Persian Gulf region (as the rivals conducted an information and propaganda war in the mass media to misinform their own and the global public). Saddam realized the power of the media and information and made “a radical, unconditional, perfectly cynical and therefore perfectly instrumental use of them” (46), writes Baudrillard. He was filming the civilian buildings blown up by the Iraqis themselves and accusing the Americans of this, thereby creating an image of war that would be useful for him. He was creating a symbol, or, as Baudrillard calls it, a “simulacrum” (47). At the same time, despite a vast amount of human suffering and violence, mostly brought about by U.S.-backed Western coalition bombings, the issue of civilian casualties did not create a discourse in Western media and the public. They also created their own image of war that was presented to their audience. These video images representing the Gulf War, rather than the war itself, became a reality for those watching television because they never saw the war with their own eyes nor were they victims of the military strikes.

Earlier, Baudrillard (1983) had argued that “power … gambles on remanufacturing artificial, social, economic, [and] political stakes.” Even the production of commodities is no longer a real economy. It is rather a “hyperreal” production and overproduction of goods, where simulation exists instead of reality (44). Simulation aims at feigning “to have what one hasn’t” and can occur everywhere (5). Baudrillard explains that if the abstraction is done professionally, it becomes more significant for those consuming the created image; it precedes reality, and reality does not exist anymore. It transforms into the “desert of the real” (2). Thus, Baudrillard’s understanding of ‘simulation’ goes beyond simple faking and is different from Wilson’s ‘virtual politics’. Simulation creates a new illusionary world, but what is even more important is that simulation damages reality. As a result,
created symbols become objects that are appealing because of certain features they seem to offer rather than because of their real value and significance. “Someone who feigns an illness,” writes Baudrillard, “produces in himself some of the symptoms” (5). These “real” symptoms dominate the sphere of virtual politics. Similarly, according to Timothy Luke (1989), nuclear deterrence works not because of the threat posed by actual nuclear arsenals but by the “rational discourse” about the costs associated with potential nuclear response (209).

This Thesis uses both the arguments developed by postmodern intellectuals, in particular, Baudrillard and the ideas on security community discussed by Adler and Barnett for explaining the puzzle of the OSCE’s continuing existence despite its unsuccessful security community-building. A theoretical model based on the thoughts of these theorists will be used to analyze how the activities of the OSCE correspond to the ideals stated in the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration and the rhetoric of its pS on the security community-building.

**Simulation of Security Community-Building: Theoretical Model**

Adler and Barnett (1998b) construct their thoughts on security community-building using the sociological approach of Karl Deutsch. Deutsch argues that “[c]ommunication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together” (quoted in Adler and Barnett 1998b, 7). Such interaction is very important for the formation of a security community because people exchange their views on themselves, external world and plans for future developments. They, thereby, learn from each other and better understand the reason behind the certain behaviour of the other. As a result, they acquire “a sense of community” and develop “mutual sympathy and loyalties,” what ultimately leads to a sense of community or “we-feeling,” as Adler and Barnett claim (8).

What is more important is that the emergence of a security community requires communication “not only among elites but also the masses.” Moreover, the transactions have to occur in various spheres, including political, economic, cultural, educational, and others (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 41). IOs can contribute to this process by encouraging interactions between States and providing them with a framework where they “learn and … even ‘teach’ others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are” (42). This Thesis draws upon this
model and considers the OSCE activities as an explanatory variable. Theoretically, in order to encourage mutual learning and understanding and be successful in constructing a security community, the OSCE would direct its efforts on encouraging communication between its pS both at the level of ruling elites and the ‘masses.’

If the security community-related rhetoric of OSCE pS and the Organization itself does not correspond to how the OSCE operates in reality, this would mean that this rhetoric is intended to camouflage the absence of actual efforts on developing a ‘we-feeling’ in the OSCE area. To understand the phenomena better, this Thesis uses Baudrillard’s thoughts on simulation and simulacrum, wherein the signs of reality created via simulation substitute actuality and thus “deter every real process by its operational double … and short-circuit all its vicissitudes” (1998, 4). The developed simulacrum, therefore, distorts reality and prevents the actors from its understanding. Ultimately, the simulacrum does not allow the actors to seek the solution of existing challenges. It, sort of, creates a new reality. In this Thesis, I focus on which OSCE activities are perceived by its staff members and pS as security community-building efforts (if any, in their view) and will compare their perceptions with what the OSCE actually does, and reveal whether the discourse on security community-building has become a simulacrum and changed the pS understanding of reality.
Does the OSCE Have Clearly Defined Objectives for the 21st Century?

International actors establish IOs in order to, in one way or another, achieve certain objectives, which are normally defined in the statutes of the same IOs. Thus, according to the Article 1 of its Charter, the United Nations, a global intergovernmental organization, must “maintain international peace and security, … develop friendly relations among nations …, achieve international co-operation in solving international problems;” and “be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends” (UN 1945). The same applies to most regional structures. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, is called upon to “unite … efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security” of its member States (NATO 1949). The Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), in turn, states that the goal of its member States is “to promote the welfare…; … economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region … [through] cooperation with other developing countries; … among themselves;” and “with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes” (SAARC 1985).

Unlike many, if not all, other IOs, the OSCE does not have a charter document as such. One may argue that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE performs this function. However, although this document stipulates 10 guiding principles (aka the ‘Decalogue’) for the relations and main spheres of cooperation among OSCE pS, it was developed and adopted during a completely different epoch, when a large number of present OSCE pS even did not exist as independent nations (like former republics of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia). Such wording of the idea behind the existence of the European security and cooperation organization as “to make détente\(^1\) both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process” or “to [overcome] the confrontation stemming from the character of… past relations” (CSCE 1975, 3) reflects the realities of the Cold War era and ceased to be valid with its end in the late

\(^1\) ‘Détente’ commonly refers to the thawing of the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and 1970s (BBC 2014).
1980s-early 1990s. Despite the active discussion of the necessity to adopt a Charter triggered by a Russia-led group of post-Soviet states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) in 2007 (Socor 2007), the OSCE has not obtained a Charter with or without defined goals and objectives to date.

Nevertheless, in the early 1990s the CSCE experienced further development: Transformation into an IO and institutionalization—creation of a few support bodies, including a Secretariat, a Conflict Prevention Centre, and an Office for Free Elections (later renamed Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) (OSCE 2007). That was made possible thanks to the Summits of the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE pS, which took place regularly until the late 1990s (there have been six OSCE Summits since 1990). An OSCE Summit is the “highest decision-making body” and holds the responsibility for defining the Organization’s “priorities and … orientation for several years” (OSCE 2016c). Each of the six Summits produced final documents with certain decisions made by the highest representatives of pS. How do the declarations and documents produced by the CSCE/OSCE Summits define the objectives of the Organization in the post-Cold War era?

To answer the question posed, this section studies by way of content analysis all the population of communications settled upon and uses the item—the whole communication—as a unit of analysis. This allows examining overall characteristics of each document and revealing whether they define the objectives of the Organization in the post-Cold War era and, if so, identifying those objectives. The 1990 Charter of Paris was the document that marked the end of the Cold War stating that “the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended” (CSCE 1990, 3). It, therefore, serves as the starting point for the analysis.

The Charter of Paris represents a document listing security responsibilities and efforts of the CSCE pS rather than defining the objectives of the Organization. In its 9,073-word Charter, “CSCE” appears 53 times compared to 124 mentions of “we” (pS). The document, therefore, focuses much on the role of the states and their vision of further regional development rather than on the role and objectives of the CSCE in this process. This changes in the subsequent documents of the Summits in 1992, 1994, 1996 with “CSCE/OSCE” appearing more frequently than “we.” However, the 1999 Istanbul Document and the 2010 Astana Declaration mention the word “we” more frequently than “CSCE/OSCE,” thereby once again focusing on the pS rather than on
the Organization.

According to the 1992 Helsinki Document, the pS encourage the CSCE “to address tensions before violence erupts and to manage crises which may regrettably develop.” The document claims that the pS recognize the CSCE to be a crucial instrument of their efforts to prevent violence and aggression. The document mentions that “CSCE peacekeeping activities” may be useful in the conflicts both within and between pS (CSCE 1992). It also states that the CSCE peacekeeping operations can involve various actions, including observation, monitoring, and deployment of civilian and military forces. This understanding of the role of the CSCE/OSCE being in line with the Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN also appears in the documents of 1992, 1994, and 1999 (CSCE 1992; CSCE 1994; OSCE 1999).

The 1994 Budapest Document states that the title of OSCE replaces the CSCE. It also says that it “will be a forum where concerns … are discussed, … security interests are heard and acted upon.” The same document defines the CSCE as “a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the region” and later states that “[r]espect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law … remain a primary goal” of the CSCE. It then highlights the future role and functions of the CSCE, including implementing its commitments; operating as a forum for consultations and making decisions; encouraging good neighbourliness; preventing and resolving conflicts; promoting cooperation; and building confidence and security (CSCE 1994).

The documents of 1996, 1999 and 2010 repeat most of the ideas about the OSCE’s role and functions of maintaining security in Europe developed in the previous declarations. Starting with the document adopted in 1992 in Helsinki, pS highlight the importance of strengthening the role of the CSCE/OSCE and its institutions to enable it to address new security challenges. Three of the documents under study, including the Budapest Document, Lisbon Document, and Istanbul document underline the CSCE/OSCE’s role in defining common values, commitments and norms of behaviour. The Paris Charter mentions nothing about the role of the CSCE. The 1992 Helsinki Document focuses on the CSCE’s efforts in preventing and resolving conflicts between its pS. The 2010 Astana Declaration, in turn, states the significance of the OSCE in strengthening “security, trust and good-neighbourly relations among … [pS] and peoples” (OSCE 2010a, 2).
More generally, those six CSCE/OSCE documents under study mostly either focus on different aspects of the CSCE/OSCE activities, or on the functions of its institutions or recognize the great potential and need for further strengthening the role of the Organization. The conducted content analysis, therefore, demonstrates that the OSCE’s fundamental documents do not state the objectives of the Organization clearly and rather contain vague definitions of the role of the Organization in the attainment of regional security. It is also unclear whether the objectives of the Organization in the post-Cold War era differ somehow from what it was supposed to achieve when there was a confrontation between the capitalist West and the communist East.

Even if the objectives of the OSCE are not defined clearly in its fundamental publicly available documents, its mission and the roadmap of how to achieve it might be formulated internally. Staff members of OSCE field presences, and institutions, including the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, therefore, should be familiar and understand them. However, interviews and informal conversations with them demonstrated that the OSCE’s employees have different perceptions of the Organization’s objectives. Thus, four out of 10 interviewees said that the OSCE’s main goal is to provide an inclusive platform for dialogue between its pS.\(^2\) One of them also mentioned that the objectives of the OSCE have not changed since the end of the Cold War and also include conflict prevention, management and resolution.\(^3\) Two OSCE staff members stated that the OSCE focuses on European security; however, Yury Padun, Senior Politico-Military Officer of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, emphasized that the OSCE’s understanding of security has broadened and now includes economic, ecological and human aspects as well as politico-military ones,\(^4\) while another interviewee formulated the goal of the OSCE as “to assist pS in their regional security efforts”.\(^5\) Yet another two employees focused much on the role of OSCE field presences which, according to them, aim at providing assistance to

\(^2\) Interviews with employees of OSCE field presences, 1 July and 9 August 2016; interview with Fred Tanner, Senior Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, 12 October 2016, and with Rasa Ostrauskaite, Deputy Director of the Policy Support Service, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, 12 October 2016.
\(^3\)Interviews with employees of OSCE field presences, Bishkek, 1 July 2016.
\(^4\) Interview with Yury Padun, Senior Politico-Military Officer of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Bishkek, 21 July 2016.
\(^5\) Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 18 July 2016.
their host countries.6 Two of them stated that the mandate of each presence depends on the needs of a certain host country and the OSCE’s activities on the ground, therefore, may differ.7 One interviewee added that the OSCE has leading principles enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, but its goals are changing because of the annually rotating Chairmanship (and every country chairing the OSCE has its own view on the goals of the Organization) and because the problems it has to address are also changing.8

In contrast to the objectives of the OSCE, the idea behind the establishment and existence of its predecessor, the CSCE, appears to be clear for interviewed political experts and OSCE employees. According to the experts, the CSCE was “a neutral platform between two political adversaries,”9 “the best forum for dialogue”10 between the Western bloc encompassing the U.S. and its allies and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc, and “one notable bridging opportunity between the West and the East.”11 In the interviews, the staff members of OSCE field presences and Secretariat in Vienna also expressed the view that the CSCE was established to provide a forum for antagonists in the Cold War to discuss security issues.

The above analysis demonstrates that the objectives of the OSCE in the 21st century are not clearly defined in its fundamental documents. Moreover, there is no common understanding of the mission of the Organization among its staff members, either. On the contrary, the role of the CSCE is perceived by interviewed subjects in the same way. The analysis, therefore, lends support to the first hypothesis formulated in this Thesis: “While the CSCE’s raison d'être during the Cold War was the direct interaction and discussion of security issues between the communist East and capitalist West, the objectives of the OSCE in the 21st century remain largely ambiguous.”

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6 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 6 July 2016, and with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 21 July 2016.
7 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 6 July 2016, with Employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 11 July 2016.
8 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 11 July 2016.
9 Interview with expert on Central Asian Politics, Bishkek, 4 July 2016.
10 Interview with Pal Dunay, Expert on the OSCE, Bishkek, 4 July 2016.
OSCE’s Security Community-building: Theory vs. Reality

Despite the vagueness of the OSCE’s objectives for the 21st century revealed above, the Organization still exists and continues to function. It might be difficult to study the activities of an IO if it is unclear what it seeks to achieve. In the case of the OSCE, given that Summits of Heads of State or Government of its pS are responsible for setting priorities of the Organization for the ensuing years, the analysis will proceed from the document adopted by the very last high-level meeting that took place in 2010 in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The “Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community” adopted by the OSCE Summit in 2010 has a two-fold character: pS reconfirmed their adherence to the commitments undertaken under OSCE fundamental documents and recognized the necessity “to work together to fully realize the vision of a comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security community throughout … [the] OSCE area” (OSCE 2010a, 3).

Six years have passed since this new orientation was approved. However, there is evidence (such as the confrontation between some pS over the crisis in and around Ukraine and the Syrian conflict) that this objective is far from being achieved. Moreover, as indicated in Chapter I, several prominent thinkers even state that we face a “new Cold War” (RT 2015; Chomsky 2015; Cohen 2007). This raises doubts about the OSCE’s security community-building activities. Hypothesis 2 of this Thesis attempts to explain the existing clashes between OSCE pS: “The real activities of the OSCE do not fully contribute to the direct multilevel and multidimensional communication among its pS that is necessary for the emergence of OSCE security community.”

This Thesis uses the data obtained during interviews with staff members of OSCE field presences and OSCE Secretariat in Vienna to test Hypothesis 2. Based on the theory of security communities by Adler and Barnett (1998b), the study assumes that being an IO, the OSCE may contribute to the building of a security community of its pS by providing the most important factor, that of communication between States. In doing so, as Adler and Barnett pose, the OSCE has to encourage communication involving both the elites and the ordinary people. Another important prerequisite for

11 Interview with Emil Dzhuraev, Expert on Central Asian Politics, Bishkek, 7 July 2016.
mutual learning and the emergence of “we-feeling” among nations is that they have to interact in various spheres, such as political, economic, cultural, educational, and many others (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 41).

As revealed by interviews conducted in this study, both OSCE staff members and representatives of the national delegations of pS feel that the Organization has not completely succeeded in its security community-building efforts. Two of the interviewed OSCE employees stated that the cooperation and dialogue between pS have varied over time, and if it was quite intensive after the end of the Cold War and in the early 2000s, today, there is a strong disagreement among states on a number of issues.12 One representative of a national delegation to the OSCE admitted that now OSCE pS “are not where [they] wanted to be in 2010, but this is … still the goal … to increase trust and confidence among [partners].”13 A staff member of a field presence even stated that “we can still see … clear frontlines between the West and the East” within the OSCE.14

Though interviewees admitted that the OSCE has not succeeded in building a security community of its pS, they also assured that the Organization does its best to achieve such a goal. In an effort to identify what the OSCE and its field presences actually do to develop a security community in its region, the following question was asked during the interviews: “What does the OSCE do to achieve the security community-related goals stated in the 2010 Astana Declaration?”

Responding to the above question, staff members of field presences referred to the regular meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council (PC), a decision-making body composed of the delegates of all pS that gathers weekly in Vienna and governs day-to-day operational work of the Organization, as a main platform for communication between OSCE pS. As in other intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors and civil society can present their ideas at the PC upon gaining permission.

In turn, staff members of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna provided more details on how the OSCE builds a security community. According to Fred Tanner, Senior Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, there are some elements of a security community within the OSCE. This can be traced from the existence of “groups of

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12 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 1 July 2016, and with Yury Padun, Senior Politico-Military Officer of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Bishkek, 21 July 2016.
13 Interview with representative of national delegation to the OSCE, Vienna, 2 September 2016, No. 1.
friends” of OSCE pS that have common views and understanding of certain issues, be it problems in Caucasus, migration, or ODIHR’s activities and maintain similar positions during the related negotiations. However, as posed by this interviewee, States always have to choose between their national interests and multilateral efforts, a choice which might well oppose each other.

The Deputy Director of the Policy Support Service of the Conflict Prevention Centre, Rasa Ostrauskaite, in turn, listed several of the OSCE’s activities in the sphere of security community building, including Security Days, initiated by the OSCE Secretary General, Lamberto Zannier, a conference (among many others) that gathers representatives of governments, civil societies, youth and media of OSCE pS as well as experts from academic institutions and international and regional organizations to discuss security threats and challenges of the 21st century; arms control measures; and activity of the OSCE institutions aimed at assisting pS in implementation of undertaken commitments. Ostrauskaite also emphasized the importance of the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, Poland, where representatives of OSCE structures, IOs, public authorities and civil society activists from pS and partner States discuss progress in the implementation of the OSCE human dimension commitments, associated challenges, share good practices and make recommendations for further improvement. However, like the previous subject, she admitted that the OSCE’s efforts cannot improve the relations between pS without their own political will.

The interviews also included a question on the activities and security community-building efforts of a certain field presence or department of the OSCE Secretariat. As told by interviewed subjects, the OSCE’s field presences are established at the request of the host government and operate within the limits of their mandates, or a list of assigned tasks. In general, the respondents perceive the idea behind the OSCE’s presence in the host country as to assist the government in meeting its commitments undertaken under the OSCE fundamental documents. Some of the interviewed subjects believe that field presences can be found in those OSCE pS facing different problems, including a potential for real conflict or frozen conflicts.

14 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 11 July 2016.
15 Interview with Fred Tanner, Senior Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, 12 October 2016.
16 Interview with Rasa Ostrauskaite, Deputy Director of the Policy Support Service, Conflict Preven-
or a threat to peace and instability.\textsuperscript{17}

As revealed, the activities of the OSCE’s field presences encompass a plethora of conferences, training and seminars for public servants and civil society. In its political-military dimension, an OSCE field presence can, among other things, support military exercises to train security agencies to coordinate their actions and purchase equipment for that purpose.\textsuperscript{18} Field presences contribute to intrastate conflict prevention through monitoring of a situation on the ground and implementation of projects that address the supposed needs of both the government and the local community. They also provide the host State with access to the best international practices in the sphere of good governance and a platform for dialogue between public authorities, media, and civil society.\textsuperscript{19}

In terms of facilitating communication and mutual understanding between pS, the OSCE’s field presences do implement projects involving other countries. In Central Asia, for example, they have initiated the Central Asian Youth Network aimed at establishing contacts between the young leaders from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia; the Young Policy Advisors Course for public servants from the region who are under 30 years old; Central Asian Internet Development Forum for the discussion of government policies regarding Internet governance in Central Asian countries; Central Asian Leadership Program for young environmental leaders; and similar efforts. However, as a rule, they are focused on a certain region within the OSCE area, be it Central Asia, the Balkans, or the Caucasus. ‘Why do the OSCE’s field presences have few projects engaging pS from different regions thereby contributing to better understanding between them?’ one may ask.

The interviewed staff members of field presences provide their own explanation of the limited number of projects engaging the larger number of the OSCE’s pS. One subject stated that the regions “are far from each other not only geographically; they do not have common grounds.”\textsuperscript{20} Another person indicated that the regions have different problems to address, and while the field presences in the

\textsuperscript{17}Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, 11 July 2016, with employee of OSCE field presence, 21 July 2016, and with Yury Padun, Senior Politico-Military Officer of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Bishkek, 21 July 2016.

\textsuperscript{18}Interview with Yury Padun, Senior Politico-Military Officer of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Bishkek, 21 July 2016.

\textsuperscript{19}Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 11 July 2016.

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Balkans have a lot of similar activities, especially focusing on the fight against hate crimes, “in Central Asia, field missions mostly focus on border issues.” Yury Padun from the OSCE Centre in Bishkek believes that people from different regions have a different mindset and ordinary Europeans, compared to those living in post-Soviet countries, are not so curious about the life in other parts of the OSCE region.

At the same time, according to some interviewees, OSCE field presences contribute to establishing contacts between pS from different regions, primarily when it comes to the exchange of experiences and best practices. However, even though field presences do bring people together, as one of the interlocutors posed it, “they would be on the different level: People from the Central Asia countries would be participants, the attendants of the conference, whereas representatives of Western countries would be the trainers, the people who would deliver presentations.”

According to Fred Tanner, Senior Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, the Secretary General and his office also make their own contribution to the OSCE’s security community-building. Firstly, they can initiate relevant discussions involving representatives of pS and independent scholars. Thus, for example, in 2015, the office of the OSCE Secretary General supervised the development of a report on the crisis in and around Ukraine and possible ways of returning all sides to dialogue, cooperation and building a security community. Secondly, the OSCE Secretary General is in a position to develop certain proposals on how to engage pS in dialogue and, thereby, facilitate communication and joint work of the national delegations to the OSCE. Thirdly, he or she might clarify situations that may provoke misunderstanding among pS and lead to termination of dialogue and cooperation amongst them.

Talking about the contribution of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) to the OSCE’s security community building, Ostrauskaite emphasized the CPC’s role in the so-called “conflict cycle.” Working on each stage of the cycle, including early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation, the Centre supposedly facilitates negotiations between the sides involved in conflicts,

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20 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 1 July 2016.
21 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 11 July 2016.
22 Interview with Yury Padun, Bishkek, 21 July 2016.
23 Interview with employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 21 July 2016.
24 Interview with Fred Tanner, Vienna, 12 October 2016.
25 The CPC is an office affiliated with the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, providing policy advice, support, and analysis to the OSCE Secretary General, Chairmanship, pS, and field presences.
supports mediation through the OSCE Secretary General and Chairmanship, implements other conflict prevention and resolution measures, and assists regional cooperation and reconciliation. According to her, what is most important in terms of building a security community is the OSCE’s endeavour to approach the same situation/conflict from different angles taking into consideration the narratives of all sides.26

The conducted interviews have not revealed what the OSCE does to establish communication between ordinary people from different pS. The question of why the OSCE does not implement projects involving the “masses” along with diplomats, public authorities, and academia was asked during the interviews with representatives of national delegations to the OSCE. One of the respondents said that “there is no reason why the OSCE cannot do this,” however, as this person posed it, “pS do not agree completely on this” and each of them has its own priorities within the Organization.27 Another interviewee, in turn, admitted that he has never thought about such possibility and never discussed this with his colleagues in the delegation and back at home.28

Comparison of the broad data by way of responses of OSCE management on the real activities of the OSCE, conducted by its departments in its Secretariat in Vienna and field presences, with the prerequisites for the development of a security community identified by Adler and Barnett (1998a; 1998b) points to a number of conclusions: Firstly, being an IO, the OSCE might be contributing to the building of a security community of its pS because it provides a number of platforms (PC meetings taking place every week, so-called “Security Days,” the annual HDIM, a plethora of other conferences and events, and interstate projects), thereby, encouraging direct communications between representatives of States and civil societies and learning from each other that theoretically would lead to the mutual understanding, common mindset and the formation of a security community. However, though the number of these activities is relatively high, their quality, format and agenda, and selection of attendees are questionable. Moreover, the interviewed OSCE staff members themselves do not see the necessity of the projects involving representatives from different corners of the OSCE area believing that its regions are either far from each

26 Interview with Rasa Ostrauskaite, Vienna, 12 October 2016.
27 Interview with representative of national delegation to the OSCE, Vienna, 2 September 2016, No. 1.
other geographically, or do not have common grounds, or have different problems to address, or have different mindset, or are not so interested in each other, or even that the OSCE’s approach is to meet security challenges in each individual country, independently.

Secondly, despite those activities being aimed at all 57 pS, they mostly focus on the same groups within the states, including politicians, public servants, media and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia. According to Adler and Barnett (1998b), the emergence of a security community requires communication “not only among elites but also the masses” (7). In the case of the OSCE, the conducted research has not revealed substantial efforts undertaken by the Organization at the level of ordinary people. Instead, the OSCE Secretariat (at least the Office of the OSCE Secretary General and the CPC) works with professional diplomats, OSCE field presences are in contact with local authorities, selected civil society, media and various experts, namely those who belong to the “most powerful, best-educated, or best-trained group in a society,” the “elite” (Cambridge Dictionary 2016).

Thirdly, and lastly, one more important prerequisite for mutual learning and the emergence of the “we-feeling” among nations is communication and interaction in various spheres, including political, economic, cultural, educational, and other sectors (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 41). The data obtained during interviews with OSCE staff members demonstrate that there is communication between representatives of pS on various topics (security threats, human rights and democracy challenges, good governance, media development, environmental protection, among others). However, the analysis does not expose structures and routine efforts and projects involving both communication and real physical and intellectual interaction between the participants and attendees of the OSCE events (such as military exercises involving agencies from different pS, for example).

The OSCE, indeed, facilitates communication between its pS, but those security community-building activities involving representatives of all 57 States mostly focus on “elites” and neglect “masses,” and those projects developed on the ground by OSCE field presences are normally limited to one (host) country or only

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28 Interview with representative of national delegation to the OSCE, Vienna, 26 September 2016, No. 2.
one region and do not engage the OSCE area as a whole. Moreover, though the projects and activities implemented by the OSCE affect a wide range of spheres, they support communications rather than the physical interaction between the participants. This section, therefore, shows that Hypothesis 2 of this Thesis holds true or fails to be disproven and the OSCE’s activities do not sufficiently facilitate mutual learning and understanding among its pS and, therefore, do not adequately contribute to building a security community in the OSCE area.

**OSCE as a “Simulacrum” in International Politics**

Hypothesis 3 of this Thesis states that “the OSCE has become a ‘simulacrum,’ a simulated model of an IO that works on facilitating cooperation and formation of communication, mutual trust and understanding among its pS.” Testing this hypothesis requires analysing how the OSCE’s activities and security community-building efforts revealed in the previous section correspond to the official security community-related discourse of the Organization and its pS. The priorities set by the OSCE Chairmanships between 2011 and 2016 are considered by this Thesis as the Organization’s official rhetoric. This is because while the decisions of the Summits represent general guidelines for the OSCE for the next few years, the priorities developed by annually rotating Chairmanship more specifically identify the OSCE’s line of action during the pS’s year in office (OSCE 2007).

Though a simulacrum is a model that serves to hide the absence of reality behind it (and the previous section has demonstrated that the OSCE’s activities are far from what security community-building is described in theory), a considerable role in its creation is played by the actors who use certain rhetoric for simulation. It is, therefore, necessary to compare what the OSCE pS say about building a security community within the OSCE with what the Organization really does in this realm.

Since the 2010 Astana Summit that agreed to work on implementing the vision of a security community in the OSCE area, the Organization has seen six Chairmanships: Lithuania in 2011, Ireland in 2012, Ukraine in 2013, Switzerland in 2014, Serbia in 2015, and Germany in 2016. Based on available documents, this Chapter concludes that the first four Chairmanships directly stated that a security community of OSCE pS is a priority for the Organization during their period in office (OSCE 2010b; OSCE 2012a; OSCE 2013; OSCE 2014). Serbia and Germany, in turn,
did not use the term “security community” to formulate their roadmaps. They, however, told about “overcoming confrontations and distrust, developing mutual understanding” (OSCE 2015, 3) and “renew[ing] dialogue between the OSCE participating States in order to regain mutual trust” (OSCE 2016b, 1) what in essence represents the same as ‘security community-building.’

Besides the general line of work, each country also provided more details on the specific tasks assigned to the OSCE for the particular one-year period. Thus, in terms of security community-building, the Lithuanian Chairmanship in 2011 sought to address frozen conflicts in the OSCE area “through the promotion of understanding and tolerance between the societies” and facilitate energy cooperation in and “jointly develop common principles” in this field (OSCE 2010b). In 2012, Ireland continued “to work towards the goal of a free, democratic, common and indivisible security community” acting “in all areas.” The Irish Chairmanship stressed the importance of Human Dimension within the OSCE and put a priority on “mov[ing] towards a common understanding of the issues at stake” and recognizing that “it would be unrealistic to expect the emergence of consensus … without an extensive and comprehensive discussion among the pS” (OSCE 2012a).

The 2013 Ukrainian Chairmanship committed itself to “promoting trust, confidence and reconciliation among the pS” (OSCE 2013, 1) and to “enhancing focused dialogue … to overcome the divergence of views” on Human Dimension issues (3) and stressing the need for the “constructive engagement of all 57 pS (5). In 2014, the Swiss even used the phrase “Creating a Security Community for the Benefit of Everyone” as a leitmotif of their Chairmanship. They prioritized facilitating dialogue and cooperation among the sides to portrayed conflicts; implementing “existing commitments relating to the human dimension [t]hrough promoting the exchange of good practices;” “exchange of tried and tested practices in emergency preparedness and … reconstruction” after natural disasters; and “exchange of experiences and … co-operation between law enforcement agencies of 57 OSCE pS” (OSCE 2014).

In 2015, the motto of the Serbian Chairmanship was “Rebuilding trust and confidence in order to create a positive agenda for the future” (OSCE 2015, 3). Taking the Chair at the time of the crisis in and around Ukraine, Serbia’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized the responsibility of
OSCE pS “to engage [the stakeholders] in creating the environment for dialogue and compromise” (5). The Serbians also expressed their view on the cooperation within the OSCE in general stating that “[a]lthough each region in the OSCE area has its specific context,” security threats and challenges require dialogue involving all pS (7).

The German Chairmanship, like some of its predecessors, has chosen its own motto: “Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security.” Predictably, the first German priority was the situation in and around Ukraine. Nevertheless, the German Chairperson-in-Office, the country’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, also reserved place for the work on “topics with the potential to bridge differences and foster renewed dialogue, trust and security in Europe” (OSCE 2016b, 6), “addressing common threats” (8), as well as for “greater economic exchange in the OSCE area,” “removal of barriers to cross-border cooperation on business and the environment,” (9) and “transnational exchange between societies” (12).

As demonstrated above, the official discourse of the OSCE on security community-building presented in the priorities of the annual Chairmanships between 2011 and 2016 puts many tasks for the Organization, such as cooperation among pS in various spheres, dialogue between societies for mutual understanding and trust and overcoming divergence of views, transnational exchange of experience and best practices in different areas, engagement of all 57 pS despite their differences, economic and environmental interaction. Thus, at the level of discourse, OSCE pS create the model of building a security community in the OSCE area that implies direct communication and physical interaction among pS in various spheres, involving all strata of their societies. It is just what Adler and Barnett described as prerequisites for the emergence of a security community (1998a; 1998b). The previous section of this Chapter revealed, however, that the activities of the OSCE field presences and OSCE Secretariat do not fully correspond to what the Organization should do to instil the “we-felling” in its pS in theory. What the OSCE does, therefore, is not really what it declares to do. Thus, the Organization serves as an institutionalized discourse on security community-building that is largely detached from reality. If sounding somewhat exaggerated, based on the data revealed in this section, it is clear that Hypothesis 3 fails to be disproven; the OSCE is merely a model that exists to hide that there are no real intentions behind it. There is no reality behind the discourse. It is a simulacrum.
How many IOs, forums, groups and other intergovernmental entities have been established by States to tackle existing and new problems and challenges and achieve prosperity for humankind to date? Plenty, no doubt. They may be very different: global (like the UN), regional (like the EU or the SAARC) and interregional (like the OSCE); institutionalized (with permanent bodies) or non-institutionalized (like it was with the CSCE meetings); dealing with political, defence, economic, trade, transport, energy, cultural and other issues. Indeed, there exist plenty of various IOs with lofty goals and new ones are still emerging.

It is indisputable that IOs have occupied their niche in international politics. Such phrases as “multilateral efforts,” “joint forces,” “collective actions,” or “common endeavour” are frequently used by politicians, media and scholars, and it is widely believed (at least by liberals and neo-liberals) that international entities and IOs, rather than individual countries, can succeed in addressing contemporary challenges. However, given economic crises, wars, terrorist attacks, poverty, inequality, abuses of human rights, environmental degradation and challenges as global warming taking place in different corners of the planet or globally, the following questions arise: Are IOs with their financial and material assets, access to best practices and political will of their member States able to meet the problems they were established to meet? If these organizations have failed to achieve their goals, what is the reason behind their existence? Why do States continue supporting such organizations financially or otherwise? These are the questions that became the foundation of this Thesis and led this research to its particular direction.

To shed light on the phenomenon of the continuing existence of IOs that fail to serve their purposes, this Thesis focused on the case of the OSCE and its avowed security community-building objective. This was not a random choice. Firstly, the OSCE’s failure to achieve the goal of building a security community in its region of influence, stated at the 2010 Astana Summit, has been recognized by its own staff members, representatives and leadership (DW 2010; OSCE 2016; The Irish Times 2012; Trend 2010). And yet, despite this, the Organization continues to operate and
Secondly, the OSCE represents an IO that fully depends on the interests and will of its pS.\textsuperscript{29} The phenomenon of its continuing existence despite demonstrated ineffectiveness, therefore, cannot be explained by Catherine Weaver’s (2003) ‘theory of hypocrisy’ according to which IOs often demonstrate gaps between the official ‘speech’ and actions because, in search of resources necessary for survival, organizations make promises that they are unable to fulfil. For an IO that is under the close control of its member States, like the case of the OSCE, it would be very difficult to hide this ‘hypocrisy’ and convince the States to continue their support.

Unlike Weaver, this Thesis did not overlook the role of such rational actors as States in preserving IOs that are not successful in achieving their goals. The purpose of it was to understand the empirical puzzle of the OSCE’s continuing survival despite its failure to build a security community of its pS and, thereby, contribute to the studies of IOs. To do this, the Thesis relied on the ideas of Jean Baudrillard (1983; 1995) arguing that the OSCE only simulates a security community-building entity and exists as an institutionalized discourse on cooperation and security community-building, thereby representing an example of Baudrillard’s ‘simulacrum’ in international politics.

The stated premise produced three questions and associated hypotheses that framed this Thesis. First, does the OSCE have clear objectives and a roadmap on how to achieve its objectives? Second, given the decision of the most recent grand meeting, the 2010 Astana Summit, on building a security community, what are the security community-building activities of the OSCE, its pS and structures? In particular, do these activities actually facilitate communication among pS and result in mutual learning and understanding? Finally, the third and the last question concerned the security community-building discourse of the OSCE pS: What image of the Organization and its security community-building efforts is created by this discourse? Do the OSCE’s real activities correspond to what pS declare the Organization does and will do?

\textsuperscript{29} This notion was repeatedly claimed by experts on the OSCE, such as Pal Dunay and others, and admitted by OSCE staff members interviewed. It is logical and rational, given that all substantial decisions within the OSCE are made by its pS on the basis of consensus.
To answer the first question, Hypothesis 1 stated that: “While the CSCE’s raison d’être during the Cold War was the direct interaction and discussion of security issues between the communist East and capitalist West, the objectives of the OSCE in the 21st century remain largely ambiguous.” Content analysis of the final documents of six CSCE/OSCE Summits starting from the 1990 Paris Charter declaring the end of the Cold War and a new era without confrontation in Europe (CSCE 1990) and the data obtained during the interviews with OSCE employees and management allowed to conclude that the hypothesized statement failed to be disproven and represented the reality on the ground.

The second question posed to analyse the empirical puzzle of the OSCE’s existence generated Hypothesis 2: “The real activities of the OSCE do not fully contribute to the direct multilevel and multidimensional communication among its pS that is necessary for the emergence of OSCE security community.” Testing this statement required a theory of security communities, thus bringing a sociological approach to the analysis of the OSCE’s activities. The comparison of the real activities of the OSCE and its field operations (revealed during interviews with OSCE staff members) with the theoretical model of the development of security communities by Adler and Barnett (1998a; 1998b) demonstrated that the Organization does not fully encourage the communication and interaction between its pS, what would in theory be necessary for security community-building. While providing a platform for dialogue, the OSCE mostly focuses its efforts on professional diplomats, national authorities, academicians and media—‘the elite’ in short—and thus neglect the ordinary people of the pS. The OSCE field presences normally limit their activities to their host country or its region and do not engage the OSCE area as a whole. Moreover, though the projects and activities implemented by the OSCE affect (at least nominally) a wide range of spheres, they largely support formalistic discussions rather than the physical interaction or intellectual exchanges between participants.

The third hypothesis concerned the image of the OSCE as a security community-building entity created by the discourse of its pS and its translation into reality. Based on the ideas of Baudrillard (1983; 1995), Hypothesis 3 stated the following: “The OSCE has become a ‘simulacrum,’ a simulated model of an IO that works on facilitating cooperation and formation of communication, mutual trust and understanding among its pS.” To test this statement, this Thesis identified the model
of the OSCE’s security community-building developed by the official rhetoric of its pS and compared this model with what the IO does in reality. The revealed gap between the discourse and reality gave grounds to assert that the OSCE with its security community-related rhetoric indeed serves as a model created to hide the absence of real and full contribution in this realm. This Thesis thus concludes that the OSCE represents an example of Baudrillard’s simulacrum in international politics.

The case of the OSCE analyzed in this Thesis provides a way to further understand the workings of modern IR and IOs, forums and other initiatives. Indeed, the failure of the international community of States to address urgent challenges (such as global warming and human suffering), despite all “multilateral efforts” and “strong commitments” to achieve common security and prosperity, calls into question the veracity of numerous declarations and statements by States and IOs and primarily holds accountable the States (as primary actors of international politics) rather than IOs established by them. This statement might trigger objections from those who believe that IOs have become international actors equal to States. It is hard not to agree with this position: IOs do play significant roles in contemporary international politics. However, States have been and remain those subjects that decide on the goals, competence and tools available to IOs to fulfil these goals.

One last remark remains to be made. This Thesis did not seek to reveal the actual purpose of the OSCE pS to declare their willingness to achieve mutual understanding and be a part of OSCE security community while not providing the IO with relevant tools and not developing necessary activities. Individual States may have different reasons behind such behaviour and share them with likeminded States. This Thesis also admits that, in all likelihood, there are pS that are truly interested in achieving the objective of security community but cannot guide the OSCE in the ‘right’ direction because of other obstructing pS. This, as well as the extent to which the conclusions of this Thesis are applicable to other IOs, remains a matter for further research. Though replicating the theoretical model proposed in this analysis may indeed be difficult and time-consuming, the phenomenon of existing ‘ineffective’ IOs is certainly one worthy of study and not out of reach for those with patience and endurance.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

1. Anonymous, Employee of OSCE field presence, Bishkek, 1 July 2016
14. Fred Tanner, Senior Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, 12 October 2016.