

## BRI in Central Asia: Energy Connectivity Projects

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### ABSTRACT

One of the strategic objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia is to provide China with alternative import/export and energy supply routes. This data article shows that the presentation and coverage of BRI projects varies considerably from country to country. The largest number of BRI projects in Central Asia are implemented in Kazakhstan and are in the oil and gas sector. By contrast, Turkmenistan is implementing only a few Chinese energy projects, though they are large-scale and its sum of investment is the second-largest of the Central Asian states.

*Keywords:* BRI, energy, China, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

### Background and data collection

This data article details Chinese bilateral and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) energy projects across Central Asia. Data collection was carried out between September 2018 and January 2019 by one CADGAT researcher in each Central Asian country. Data were harvested from official statistics, local and international media news, government press releases, interviews and reports. These sources formed the basis for the collection of news clippings about BRI projects in the main table below. The results do not provide an exhaustive list of Chinese projects in the region, but they paint an informative picture of Chinese and BRI activity.

### Main findings

The energy sector is one of the main targets of Chinese investment in Central Asia. Due to the strategic importance of energy resources, even projects launched before BRI was announced have been presented as BRI success stories.

The projects range from small-scale projects worth a couple million USD (e.g. small

hydropower plants) to large-scale oil and gas pipelines/complexes, such as the Central Asia–China gas pipeline, costing 7 bln USD. Unlike the Kazakh petroleum sector, in which Beijing has been active since the late 1990s, energy projects in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, were mostly implemented after 2010. Most of the Chinese projects in the Uzbek energy sector are only in their initial stages because the country has only recently started encouraging Chinese energy investment more actively.

This data article is part of a series of such articles on BRI in Central Asia. All the data are also available in a unified Excel database at the following address:

<http://osce-academy.net/en/research/cadgat/>

Number of energy projects and total funding by country		
	Projects	Total funding (mln USD)
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	20	18 849.5
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	12	205.3
<b>Tajikistan</b>	7	4 516
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	5	2 713
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	4	9 410

## **Definitions**

*Financing* – Sources of funding for each project are identified and presented.

*Commercial interests* – A project is classified as “commercial”, if the parties promoting it primarily pursue commercial goals.

*Strategic interests* – A project is classified as “strategic”, if it fits one of the broader categories, particularly strengthening connectivity.

*Connection to the BRI* – If a project is announced publicly as part of the BRI, then it is classified as a “BRI project”.

*Local project* – A project is classified as “local”, if the infrastructure or facility constructed and services provided, are limited to a specific country.

*Regional project* – A project is classified as “regional”, if it is part of the bigger regional initiative, which includes more than one country.

*Bilateral* – A project is classified as “bilateral”, if an agreement for project implementation is signed by the Chinese government or a Chinese company, as one party, and one of the Central Asian governments or companies as the other.

*Multilateral* – A project is classified as “multilateral”, if an agreement for project implementation is signed by three or more parties, including the Chinese or Central Asian governments, multilateral financial institutions (AIIB, China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China or New Silk Road Fund) and private enterprises.

Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
<b>KAZAKHSTAN</b>					
Planned	Construction of a metallurgical plant.	Total cost of the project: 94.8 mln USD. Source of financing: • private; • Sinosteel JEMECO.	Commercial: Part of the Kazakh–Chinese investment developments under the BRI–Nurly Zhol integration.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2019 (planned)	Construction of the Turgun 3 hydropower station: EcoEnergy.	Total cost of the project: 250 mln USD. Source of financing: • private.	Commercial: Part of the Kazakh–Chinese investment developments under the BRI–Nurly Zhol integration.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2018–2020	Construction of a wind farm with a 60 MW capacity in the Shelek corridor.	Total cost of the project 149 mln USD. Source of financing: • quasi-governmental; • China Water Electric Co., Ltd.	Commercial: The region of Almaty offers one of the most unique sites in the world for the construction of wind farms in the Dzungar Gate and Shelek corridor. In the Dzhungar Gate, a total wind power capacity of more than 1,000 MW could be developed. In 2015, Samruk Energo and China International Water Corporation and Power Engineers (KMKVHE) signed a memorandum of cooperation on the implementation of the project “Construction of a 60 MW wind farm in the Shelek corridor with the prospect of extensions up to 300 MW.”  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2018–2020	Construction of the Kerbulak hydroelectric station on the Ili River.	Total cost of the project: 152 mln USD. Source of financing: • quasi-governmental; • China Water Electric Co., Ltd.	Commercial: An implementation agreement was signed for a project to construct the Kerbulak hydroelectric station on the Ili River in 2015.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2018–2020	Production of oil and gas equipment: KazMunayGaz.	Total cost of the project: 100 mln USD. Source of financing: • quasi-governmental; • China National Petroleum Corporation.	Strategic: Construction of the plant will ensure import substitution for 70% of pipeline products imported into Kazakhstan.  The project is included in the roadmap for Kazakhstan’s industrialization and the China’s BRI. The project for the production of welded steel pipes became possible following the meeting of President Nazarbayev and President Xi Jinping in 2014; the programme of integrated strategic cooperation in the oil and gas industry was signed between joint-stock company (JSC) KazMunayGaz and CNPC.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral

Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
2018	Coal processing complex: Karagandy CCI LLP.	Total cost of the project: 2.5 bln USD. Source of financing: • private; • Tsinghua Corporation; 51% of shares in the company.	Commercial: The enterprise will be able to process over 5 mln tonnes of coal per year from the Shubarkol and Kuznetsky open-pit mines and also produce up to 1 mln tonnes of diesel fuel per year. The project aims at introducing technologies for producing synthetic liquid fuel and petrochemical products from coal from Kazakhstani fields. The project aims to provide the country's domestic market with high-quality diesel, develop the central region of the country and produce coal chemistry products.  The agreement on the implementation of the project "Construction of a coal processing complex in Kazakhstan" was signed within the framework of the agreements reached during the visit of President Nazarbayev to China in 2014. The project is one of 51 China-Kazakhstan joint venture projects announced.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2018–2020	Construction of small hydropower stations on the Shelek River (HPP-1, 2, 19, 29), JSC Samruk-Energo.	Total cost of the project: 117 mln USD. Source of financing: • quasi-governmental; • China Water Electric Co., Ltd.	Commercial: At the 2017 meeting of the Kazakh-Chinese Business Council, a memorandum of cooperation was signed with the Chinese Hydrochina Corporation.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2022	40 MW solar power station: Gulshat.	Total cost of the project: 69 mln USD. Source of financing: • publicly guaranteed loan to the private sector from ABII.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2006–2013	Construction of the Moinak hydropower station.	Total cost of the project: 360 mln USD. Source of financing: • State Development Bank of Kazakhstan – 133 mln USD; • State Development Bank of China – 200 mln USD; • The rest of the funding was provided by shareholders of Moinak HPP JSC, represented by Samruk-Energy JSC.	Strategic: Aims to provide the southern regions of Kazakhstan with electricity and cover peak loads in the southern zone. The logical conclusion from the foregoing is that the main consumers of the products of the Moinak hydropower plant will be located in the southern regions of Kazakhstan, in particular the city of Almaty.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral

<b>Timing</b>	<b>Project</b>	<b>Financing</b>	<b>Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)</b>	<b>Local vs regional</b>	<b>Bilateral vs multilateral</b>
2016–2018	Construction of a metallurgical plant (an integrated alloys plant) by Sin Yuan Steel LLP.	Total cost of the project: 50 mln USD. Source of financing: • private; • Jiangdon KE LLP.	Strategic: According to the programme of industrial–innovative development, by 2019, the share of steel produced in Kazakhstan (compared to 2012) should reach 30% of the total consumption. But, the Karaganda metallurgical plant, for example, only meets 10% of the demand; the remaining 90%, or more than one million tonnes, Kazakhstan imports from other countries, mainly from Russia—Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk. The main goal is to increase the import substitution of steel products. The programme was adopted in November 2014 during the visit of the Prime Minister of China to Kazakhstan.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2018	Liquefied natural gas production in Taraz by Gaz Onimderi.	Total cost of the project: 40 mln USD. Source of financing: • private; • Wison Engineering Ltd.; • 80% of financing is from Kazakhstan Development Bank and 20% from is Chinese investments.	Commercial.  Branded as a BRI project. During Nazarbayev’s visit to China, a memorandum was signed between the Ministry of Investment and Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the State Committee for Development and Reform of the PRC, which updated the list of 51 joint Kazakh–Chinese investment developments under the BRI–Nurly Zhol integration.  Branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2022	Reconstruction of two power units by the Eurasian Energy Corporation JSC.	Total cost of the project: 600 mln USD. Source of financing: • private; • China Nonferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering and Construction Co. (NFC).	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project. Eurasian Energy Corporation is a subsidiary of the Eurasian Resources Group in the city of Aksu. The project will increase the power of each unit from 300 to 325 MW.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2019	Construction of the Turgun 2 hydropower station by EcoEnergy LLP.	Total cost of the project: 23.3 mln USD. Source of financing: • Kazakhstan Development Bank; • Some private companies in Kazakhstan.	Strategic: The construction of the first hydroelectric station from the cascade of small hydropower plants on the Turgusun River will provide 23% of the electric power demand of the area. Also, the project should reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 680 tonnes per year. The project information appears to be controversial. Financing of the project is 100% internal, however, the contractor is a Chinese JSC: Tebian Electric Apparatus (TBEA). The Chinese company also uses its own technology and equipment. Some experts think that it is a part of the BRI, since the project will presumably supply the future anodic copper production project that is also planned to be accomplished with the help of Chinese investment. However, apart	Local	Bilateral

Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
			from the involvement of a Chinese company in the construction, there is no hard evidence proving that it is a BRI project.		
2013	Second stage of the second branch of the Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline: Beineu–Bozoi–Kyzylorda–Shymkent.	Total cost of the project: 700 mln USD. Source of financing: • Loan from China Development Bank.	Strategic: Kazakhstan obtained an opportunity to deliver its gas to international markets. The “energy silk way project” is the first project to end the monopoly of Russia over gas exports. The second branch of the Kazakhstan–China pipeline will deliver gas to more than 500 communities in Kazakhstan.  Not branded as a BRI project, but it is part of the regional project Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline, which is also known as the “energy silk way”.	Regional	Bilateral
2010–2013	The construction of two new oil pumping stations, part of the second phase of the construction of the Kazakhstan–China oil trunk pipeline system.	Total cost of the project: 135.4 mln USD. Source of financing: • 50% share of CNPC.	Commercial: Increasing the capacity of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline in the Atasu–Alashankou section to 20 mln tonnes/year.  Not branded as a BRI project. However, it is part of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, which aligns perfectly with the premise of the BRI.	Local	Bilateral
2010	First stage of construction of the second branch of the Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline: Beineu–Bozoi–Kyzylorda–Shymkent.	Total cost of the project: 4 bln USD. Source of financing: • KazTransGaz and Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company Limited (authorized capital of Beineu Shymkent LLP) – 1 bln USD; • China Development Bank and Bank of China – 3 bln USD.	Strategic: Kazakhstan obtained an opportunity to deliver its gas to international markets. The energy silk way project is the first project that ends the monopolistic power of Russia over gas exports. The second branch of the Kazakhstan–China pipeline will also allow for the arrival of gas to more than 500 communities in Kazakhstan.  Not branded as a BRI project, but it is part of the regional project “Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline”, which is also known as the “energy silk way”.	Regional	Bilateral
2009	Construction of the first branch of the Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline.	Total cost of the project: 7.5 bln USD. Source of financing: • Loans from China Development Bank; • The construction was carried out by the joint venture Asian Gas Pipeline, which was created by KazMunayGaz and TransAsiaPipeline	Strategic: Kazakhstan obtained an opportunity to deliver its gas to international markets. The “energy silk way project” is the first project that ends the monopolistic power of Russia over gas exports.  Not branded as a BRI project, but it is a part of the regional project “Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline”, which is also known as the “energy silk way”.	Regional	Bilateral

Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
		Limited (Subsidiary of CNPC).			
2006–2009	Construction of the oil pipeline: Kenkiyak–Kumkol.	Total cost of the project: 850 mln USD. Source of financing: • 50% share of CNPC.	Strategic: The pipeline is the third stage in an intergovernmental Kazakhstan–China oil transportation project, the development of which allows Kazakhstani oil to reach foreign markets. It is also the first pipeline that does not cross Russia.  Not branded as a BRI project. However, it is part of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, which aligns perfectly with the premise of the BRI.	Local	Bilateral
2004	Construction of the oil pipeline Atasu–Alashankou and the Kazakhstan–China pipeline.	Total cost of the project: 800 mln USD. Source of financing: • 50% share of CNPC.	Strategic: The pipeline is the second stage in an intergovernmental Kazakhstan–China oil transportation project, the development of which allows Kazakhstani oil to reach foreign markets. It is also the first pipeline that does not cross Russia.  Not branded as a BRI project. However, it aligns well with the premise of the BRI.	Regional	Bilateral
2002–2003	Construction of the oil pipeline.	Total cost of the project: 359 mln USD. Source of financing: • 49% share of CNPC.	Strategic: The pipeline is the first stage in an intergovernmental Kazakhstan–China oil transportation project, the development of which allows Kazakhstani oil to reach foreign markets.  Not branded as a BRI project. However, it is part of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, which perfectly aligns with the premise of the BRI.	Local	Bilateral
<b>UZBEKISTAN</b>					
2011–2014	Line C of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline.	Information not available.	Strategic: Launching line C of the gas pipeline creates an alternative export destination in the eastern direction in the form of the construction of a 529-km Uzbek section of the pipeline. Contractor: CNPC.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Regional	Multilateral
2017–2020	Construction of 8.0 MW Kamolot small hydropower station (HPS).	Total cost of the project: 13.1 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Strategic: National hydropower SC (stock company) UzbekHydroEnergo (UzbekGidroEnergo) was established by divesting from the national power SC, UzbekEnergo, based on the presidential decree, PP 2272, from 2 May 2017. The main objective of the presidential decree is to diversify power generation sources by doubling the existing ~1200 MW generation capacity of the hydropower stations by 2030. The programme includes the construction of dozens of (presidential decree enlists 70 projects)	Local	Bilateral

Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
			new medium and small hydropower stations and the modernization of the existing large and medium-size hydropower stations. Chinese companies have become very active since the change in the political landscape in the country. These medium and small hydropower investment projects constituted the largest portion of the ~20 bln USD economic cooperation agreements made during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's first official visit to the PRC from 10 to 14 May 2017.  Not branded as a BRI project.		
2017–2019	Construction of 12.0 MW small HPS Tuyabuguz at the water reservoir.	Total cost of the project: 8.1 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2019	Construction of a 12.0 MW small HPS on the Big Ferghana Channel.	Total cost of the project: 12.0 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2018–2021	Construction of 18.0 MW small HPS Kamchik on Ahangaran River.	Total cost of the project: 9.3 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2020	Construction of 69.0 MW small HPS cascade Zarchob on Tupalang River.	Total cost of the project: 29.1 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2020	Modernization of Farhad HPS by expanding capacity to 127.0 MW (1st phase).	Total cost of the project: 55.8 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2020	Modernization of Lower Cascade–Boysun HPS (HPS No. 14) to 15.0 MW.	Total cost of the project: 25.8 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral

<b>Timing</b>	<b>Project</b>	<b>Financing</b>	<b>Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)</b>	<b>Local vs regional</b>	<b>Bilateral vs multilateral</b>
2017–2020	Modernization of Cascade–Kadirinskiy HPS (HPS No. 3) to 15.34 MW.	Total cost of the project: 9.8 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2020	Modernization of Cascade–Tashkentkiy HPS (HPS No. 9) to 16.6 MW.	Total cost of the project: 21.7 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2020	Modernization of the branch of Shakhrikhan Southern Ferghana Canal-1 cascades HPS to 7.05 MW.	Total cost of the project: 5.2 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
2017–2020	Modernization of the branch of Shakhrikhan Southern Ferghana Canal-2 cascades HPS to 7.05 MW.	Total cost of the project: 15.4 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China credit.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral
<b>TAJIKISTAN</b>					
2014 and 2016	Two combined heat and power plants in Dushanbe.	Total estimated cost of the project: 332–350 mln USD.	Commercial: After the construction and launch of the second stage, the power of which, according to the plan, is 300 MW, the total power generation capacity of combined heat and power (CHP) will reach 400 MW. Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rahmon, granted Chinese contracting company (TBEA) exclusive rights to operate two gold mines. TBEA will operate the two mines until it can recoup its 332 mln USD investment.  Branded as a BRI project. The project was financed according to the Agreement on Preferential Credit between the Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan and Exim Bank of China and China Development Bank.	Local	Bilateral

Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
2015	Tajik section of line D of the China–Central Asia gas pipeline.	Total cost of the project: 3.188 bln USD. Source of financing: • 2.5 bln USD for construction (including 1.3 bln USD for purchasing equipment); • Line D is expected to begin operating at full capacity in January 2020; • The Tajik side has borrowed 300 mln USD from a bank in Hong Kong.	Strategic. Tajikistan is expected to gain 4.5 bln USD from the project over 32 years. The pipeline’s length is 391 km (according to some sources it is 400 or 410 km) over Tajik territory. 166 hectares of land was allocated for the construction with a 49-year lease. The project will create more than 3,000 jobs in Tajikistan. The loan carries an annual interest rate of 2.7% and is to be paid down over 26 years. Construction was suspended in 2016.  Branded as a BRI project. Agreement on the main principles of cooperation between the Government of Tajikistan and JV Trans-Tajik Gas Pipeline Company Ltd. (TTGP). Contractor: Trans-Asia Pipeline. Loan agreement between the companies Tajik Trans Gas and Trans-Asia Pipeline.	Regional	Bilateral
April 2015	Power transmission line connecting Dushanbe with distant regions.	Information not available.	Commercial.  Not branded as a BRI project. The construction of a second power line was initiated in April 2015 with the goal of connecting the capital, Dushanbe, with distant regions.	Local	Bilateral
2014–2016 (First phase)	Oil refinery in the Dangara Free Economic Zone.	Total cost of the project: 400 mln USD: • First phase: 80 mln USD; • Second phase: 300 mln USD.	Commercial: 36 people are currently working in the refinery, including 21 local employees and 15 foreign workers. Oil refinery capacity will be 300,000 tonnes in the first phase and 1.2 mln tonnes in the second phase. It is expected that 1,200 permanent jobs will be created.  Branded as a BRI project. Investors: Chinese Dong Ying Heli Investment and Development and Tajik Khasan and Co. The share of the Chinese investments will account for 90%. If a third phase is added, another 500 mln USD will be invested.	Local	Bilateral
2013	Bokhtar oil and gas field development.	Total cost of the first phase of the project: 80–100 mln USD.	Commercial: Bokhtar covers a total area of approximately 35,000 km <sup>2</sup> in the Tajik portion of the prolific Amu Darya basin west of the Pamir Mountains, with 3.2 trillion m <sup>3</sup> of gas reserves. In 2015, Tajikistan demanded that Tethys, CNPC and Total hand back 25% of the Bokhtar oil and gas field to the Tajik government, arguing that the foreign companies had failed to deliver any tangible results in seven years of operation in the country.  Not branded as a BRI project. Contractors: CNPC, Total, Tethys. Tethys has operated in the country since 2008, signed a farm-out agreement and a production sharing agreement (PSA) with CNPC and Total in 2013, with each party taking a 33.33% share in the project.	Local	Multilateral

<b>Timing</b>	<b>Project</b>	<b>Financing</b>	<b>Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)</b>	<b>Local vs regional</b>	<b>Bilateral vs multilateral</b>
2009	South–North 500 kV power transmission line in Tajikistan.	Total cost of the project: 420 mln USD.  Credit for the construction was provided by the Exim Bank of China in the amount of 282 mln USD.	Strategic: This 500 kV south–north power transmission line, constructed in Tajikistan with a length of 325 km, allowed the country to become independent of the Uzbek power transmission network and distribute electricity throughout the country. Should Beijing decide to import hydroelectricity from Tajikistan in the future, it will probably expand the transmission capacity of this line through BRI funds and objectives.  Not branded as a BRI project. Contractor: TBEA.	Local	Bilateral
2008	220 kV Lolazor–Khatlon domestic power transmission line.	Total cost of the project: 58 mln USD: Exim Bank of China.	Strategic: The first attempt to connect the northern and southern parts of the country via transmission lines bypassing (conflicting at that moment with) Uzbekistan. Introduction of the 220-kV, 93-km Lolazor–Khatlon power transmission line was constructed by China's TBEA. The total cost of the Lolazor–Khatlon project was 58 mln USD. The Chinese side provided 55.1 mln USD in preferential loans, carrying an annual interest of 2%, and Tajikistan contributed 2.9 mln USD to the project's budget. In the future, should Beijing decide to import hydroelectricity from Tajikistan, it will probably expand the transmission capacity of this line through BRI funds and objectives.  Not branded as a BRI project. Contractor: TBEA.	Local	Bilateral
<b>KYRGYZSTAN</b>					
2019–2021	Construction of the China–Central Asia gas pipeline, Kyrgyzstan section.	Total cost of the project: 1.5 bln USD.	Strategic: This is a regional gas transit project from Turkmenistan to China through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, the gas pipeline will run through the Alay and Chong-Alay districts of the Osh region. The length of the gas pipeline in the Kyrgyz territory is 215 km. The volume of supplies will be 30 mln m <sup>3</sup> of Turkmen gas annually.  Branded as a BRI project.	Regional	Bilateral
2018	Building a new parliament complex.	Total cost of the project: 230 mln USD.	Commercial: Having returned from Beijing with 310 mln USD in loans and grants in 2017, the president of Tajikistan announced that 230 mln USD would go towards building a new parliament complex.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Local	Bilateral

Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
2014–2017	Modernization of the thermal power plant in Bishkek.	Total cost of the project: 386 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China.	Strategic: After modernization, the thermal power plant capacity reached 812 MW (up from the previous 300 MW), of which 300 MW was due to the construction and commissioning of two new power units. Each unit produces 150 MW. This is the largest thermal power station in Kyrgyzstan, which provides the population of Bishkek with thermal energy.  Not branded as a BRI project. Exim Bank of China has allocated 386 mln dollars for 20 years at 2% per annum with a grace period of 11 years. Contractor: TBEA.	Local	Bilateral
2013–2015	Construction of high-voltage power lines from Datka to Kemin.	Total cost of the project: 389 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China.	Strategic: The transmission line is 405 km long, connects substations Datka (south) and Kemin (north). This project provides energy security for the north of Kyrgyzstan. The introduction of lines allows the northern region of Kyrgyzstan not to transport electricity through its neighbours, but directly in order to receive it from the south.  Not branded as a BRI project. Exim Bank of China allocated 389 mln USD to the project for a period of 20 years at 2% per annum with a grace period of 9 years. Soft Loan. Contractor: TBEA.	Local	Bilateral
2011–2013	Modernization of high-voltage power lines from Datka to Yug.	Total cost of the project: 208 mln USD. Source of financing: • Exim Bank of China.	Strategic: The substation 500 kV Datka was built and existing substations 220 kV Kristall, Oktyabrskaya, Uzlovaya and Alay were reconstructed by TBEA. Since reconstruction, the Datka substation receives all electricity from the lower cascade of the hydropower stations, which includes the Kurpsai, Tashkumyr, Shamaldysai and Uch-Kurgan hydropower stations. This substation eliminates the dependence of southern Kyrgyzstan on the high-voltage networks of Uzbekistan.  Not branded as a BRI project. Exim Bank of China allocated a loan of USD 208 mln to the project for a period of 20 years at 2% per annum with a grace period of 7 years. Soft Loan. Contractor: TBEA.	Local	Bilateral
<b>TURKMENISTAN</b>					
2018	Port Turkmenbashy (by Gap İnşaat Yatırım ve Dış Ticaret A. Ş.).	Total cost of the project: 1.5 bln USD. Source of financing: • Turkmen government.	Strategic: The port will promote the activation of trade, tourism and military partnerships between Turkmenistan and other countries.  Commercial: Cargo-handling capacity of 25–26 mln tonnes/year.	Regional	Bilateral

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Timing	Project	Financing	Description (commercial vs strategic; connection to BRI)	Local vs regional	Bilateral vs multilateral
			Not branded as a BRI project, but some Chinese officials have highlighted that the port contributes to the BRI and Turkmen authorities have acknowledged this.		
2012–2014	The China-Central Asia gas pipeline, line C.	The cost of the Turkmen section of line C: 600 mln USD.	Commercial and strategic: Central Asian countries will profit from transit fees and Turkmenistan will get the revenues from selling gas.  Not branded as a BRI project. The pipeline was constructed by Stroytransgaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom, China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation (CPECC) and Zeromax.	Regional	Bilateral
2011	The Central Asia–China gas pipeline, line D.	Information not available.	Commercial and strategic: Turkmenistan obtains revenues and the countries of Central Asia obtain investments from China. China obtains an additional 25 bln m <sup>3</sup> of gas/year.  Agreement signed in 2011. Initial completion date planned for 2016, rescheduled to 2020.  Not branded as a BRI project. Contractor: CNPC.	Regional	Bilateral
2008, 2009, 2010	The Central Asia–China gas pipeline includes three lines. Pipelines A and B are exclusively dedicated to importing gas from Turkmenistan.	Total cost of lines A and B: 7.31 bln USD.	Commercial and strategic: Turkmenistan receives a loan of 4 bln USD. China aims to obtain 55 bln m <sup>3</sup> of gas per year.  Strategic: After Russia’s refusal to buy Turkmen gas, Turkmenistan found a new market: China.  Construction started in 2008; line A became operational in December 2009; line B became operational in October 2010.  Not branded as a BRI project.	Regional	Bilateral

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## About CADGAT and Central Asia Regional Data Review

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the OSCE Academy established the Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) in 2009. The purpose of CADGAT is to produce new cross-regional data on Central Asia that can be used free of charge by researchers, journalists, NGOs, government employees, and students, both inside and outside the region. The data articles can be found at <http://osce-academy.net/en/research/cadgat/>

The following CADGAT data articles have been published:

1. Hydroelectric dams and conflict in Central Asia
2. The narcotics trade and related issues in Central Asia
3. Language use and language policy in Central Asia
4. The transportation sector in Central Asia
5. Road transportation in Central Asia
6. Gender and politics in Central Asia
7. Political relations in Central Asia
8. Trade policies and major export items in Central Asia
9. Intra-regional trade in Central Asia
10. Trade barriers and tariffs in Central Asia
11. Holidays in Central Asia. Part I: Laws and official holidays
12. Holidays in Central Asia. Part II: Professional and working holidays
13. Media in Central Asia: Print Media
14. Media in Central Asia: TV
15. Media in Central Asia: Radio
16. Renewable energy policies of the Central Asian countries
17. Wind power potential of the Central Asian countries
18. Solar power potential of the Central Asian countries
19. Hydropower potential of the Central Asian countries
20. BRI in Central Asia: Overview of Chinese projects
21. BRI in Central Asia: Rail and road connectivity projects
22. BRI in Central Asia: Energy connectivity projects

CADGAT has also produced a database on Elites in Central Asia, which can be found at <http://osce-academy.net/dbelite/>



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